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Bostic v. Shaefer
Ruling Below: Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F.Supp.2d 456 (E.D. Va. 2014).
Same-sex couples filed § 1983 action challenging constitutionality of Virginia statutes and
constitutional provisions prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying and refusing to recognize
same-sex marriages performed elsewhere. The United States District Court for the Eastern
District of Virginia entered summary judgment in plaintiffs' favor and granted injunctive relief.
State appealed. Plaintiffs in similar class action intervened.
Question Presented: Whether Virginia codes §§ 20-45.2 and 20-45.3, the Marshall/Newman
Amendment, and any other Virginia law that bars same sex-marriages from other jurisdictions
(collectively, the Virginia Marriage Laws) violate Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of
the Fourteenth Amendment.

Timothy B. BOSTIC; Tony C. London; Carol Schall; Mary Townley,
Plaintiffs—Appellees,
Joanne Harris; Jessica Duff; Christy Berghoff; Victoria Kidd, on behalf of themselves and
all others similarly situated, Intervenors,
v.
George E. SHAEFER, III, in his official capacity as the Clerk of Court for Norfolk Circuit
Court, Defendant—Appellant,
and
Janet M. Rainey in her official capacity as State Registrar of Vital Records; Robert F.
McDonnell, in his official capacity as Governor of Virginia; Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, II, in his
official capacity as Attorney General of Virginia, Defendants,
Michéle McQuigg, Intervenor/Defendant.
United States Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit
Decided on July 28, 2014
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
FLOYD, Circuit Judge:
Via various state statutes and a state
constitutional amendment, Virginia prevents
same-sex couples from marrying and refuses
to recognize same-sex marriages performed
elsewhere. Two same-sex couples filed suit

to challenge the constitutionality of these
laws, alleging that they violate the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment. The district court
granted the couples' motion for summary
judgment and enjoined Virginia from
enforcing the laws. This appeal followed.
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approximate the design, qualities,
significance, or effects of marriage. Nor
shall this Commonwealth or its political
subdivisions create or recognize another
union, partnership, or other legal status
to which is assigned the rights, benefits,
obligations, qualities, or effects of
marriage.

Because we conclude that Virginia's samesex marriage bans impermissibly infringe on
its citizens' fundamental right to marry, we
affirm.
I.
A.
This case concerns a series of statutory and
constitutional mechanisms that Virginia
employed to prohibit legal recognition for
same-sex relationships in that state. Virginia
enacted the first of these laws in
1975: Virginia Code section 20–45.2, which
provides that “marriage between persons of
the same sex is prohibited.” After the
Supreme Court of Hawaii took steps to
legalize same-sex marriage in the mid–
1990s, Virginia amended section 20–45.2 to
specify that “[a]ny marriage entered into by
persons of the same sex in another state or
jurisdiction shall be void in all respects in
Virginia and any contractual rights created
by such marriage shall be void and
unenforceable.” In 2004, Virginia added
civil unions and similar arrangements to the
list of prohibited same-sex relationships via
the Affirmation of Marriage Act.
Virginia's efforts to ban same-sex marriage
and other legally recognized same-sex
relationships
culminated
in
the
Marshall/Newman Amendment to the
Virginia Constitution:
That only a union between one man and
one woman may be a marriage valid in
or recognized by this Commonwealth
and its political subdivisions.
This Commonwealth and its political
subdivisions shall not create or
recognize a legal status for relationships
of unmarried individuals that intends to

The Virginia Constitution imposes two
hurdles that a potential amendment must
jump before becoming law: the General
Assembly must approve the amendment in
two separate legislative sessions, and the
people must ratify it. The General Assembly
approved
the
Marshall/Newman
Amendment in 2005 and 2006. In November
2006, Virginia's voters ratified it by a vote
of fifty-seven percent to forty-three percent.
In the aggregate, Virginia Code sections 20–
45.2 and 20–45.3 and the Marshall/Newman
Amendment prohibit same-sex marriage,
ban other legally recognized same-sex
relationships,
and
render
same-sex
marriages performed elsewhere legally
meaningless under Virginia state law.
B.
Same-sex couples Timothy B. Bostic and
Tony C. London and Carol Schall and Mary
Townley (collectively, the Plaintiffs)
brought this lawsuit to challenge the
constitutionality of Virginia Code sections
20–45.2 and 20–45.3, the Marshall/Newman
Amendment, and “any other Virginia law
that bars same-sex marriage or prohibits the
State's recognition of otherwise-lawful
same-sex
marriages
from
other
jurisdictions” (collectively, the Virginia
Marriage Laws). The Plaintiffs claim that
the “inability to marry or have their
relationship
recognized
by
the
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Commonwealth of Virginia with the dignity
and respect accorded to married oppositesex couples has caused them significant
hardship ... and severe humiliation,
emotional
distress,
pain,
suffering,
psychological harm, and stigma.”
Bostic and London have been in a longterm, committed relationship with each other
since 1989 and have lived together for more
than twenty years. They “desire to marry
each other under the laws of the
Commonwealth in order to publicly
announce their commitment to one another
and to enjoy the rights, privileges, and
protections that the State confers on married
couples.” On July 1, 2013, Bostic and
London applied for a marriage license from
the Clerk for the Circuit Court for the City
of Norfolk. The Clerk denied their
application because they are both men.
Schall and Townley are women who have
been a couple since 1985 and have lived
together as a family for nearly thirty years.
They were lawfully married in California in
2008. In 1998, Townley gave birth to the
couple's daughter, E. S.-T. Schall and
Townley identify a host of consequences of
their inability to marry in Virginia and
Virginia's refusal to recognize their
California
marriage,
including
the
following:
• Schall could not visit Townley in the
hospital for several hours when Townley
was admitted due to pregnancy-related
complications.
• Schall cannot legally adopt E. S.-T., which
forced her to retain an attorney to petition
for full joint legal and physical custody.

• Virginia will not list both Schall and
Townley as E. S.-T.'s parents on her birth
certificate.
• Until February 2013, Schall and Townley
could not cover one another on their
employer-provided
health
insurance.
Townley has been able to cover Schall on
her insurance since then, but, unlike an
opposite-sex spouse, Schall must pay state
income taxes on the benefits she receives.
• Schall and Townley must pay state taxes
on benefits paid pursuant to employee
benefits plans in the event of one of their
deaths.
• Schall and Townley cannot file joint state
income tax returns, which has cost them
thousands of dollars.
On July 18, 2013, Bostic and London sued
former Governor Robert F. McDonnell,
former Attorney General Kenneth T.
Cuccinelli, and George E. Schaefer, III, in
his official capacity as the Clerk for the
Circuit Court for the City of Norfolk. The
Plaintiffs filed their First Amended
Complaint on September 3, 2013. The First
Amended Complaint added Schall and
Townley as plaintiffs, removed McDonnell
and Cuccinelli as defendants, and added
Janet M. Rainey as a defendant in her
official capacity as the State Registrar of
Vital Records. The Plaintiffs allege that the
Virginia Marriage Laws are facially invalid
under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment and
that Schaefer and Rainey violated 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 by enforcing those laws.
The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment. The Plaintiffs also requested a
permanent injunction in connection with
their motion for summary judgment and
518

moved, in the alternative, for a preliminary
injunction in the event that the district court
denied their motion for summary judgment.
The district court granted a motion by
Michele McQuigg-the Prince William
County Clerk of Court-to intervene as a
defendant on January 21, 2014. Two days
later, new Attorney General Mark Herringas Rainey's counsel-submitted a formal
change in position and refused to defend the
Virginia Marriage Laws, although Virginia
continues to enforce them. McQuigg
adopted Rainey's prior motion for summary
judgment and the briefs in support of that
motion.
The district court held that the Virginia
Marriage Laws were unconstitutional on
February 14, 2014. It therefore denied
Schaefer's and McQuigg's motions for
summary judgment and granted the
Plaintiffs' motion. The district court also
enjoined Virginia's employees-including
Rainey and her employees-and Schaefer,
McQuigg, and their officers, agents, and
employees from enforcing the Virginia
Marriage Laws. The court stayed the
injunction pending our resolution of this
appeal.
Rainey, Schaefer, and McQuigg timely
appealed the district court's decision. We
have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §
1291. On March 10, 2014, we allowed the
plaintiffs from Harris v. Rainey—a similar
case pending before Judge Michael
Urbanski in the Western District of Virginiato intervene. Judge Urbanski had previously
certified that case as a class action on behalf
of “all same-sex couples in Virginia who
have not married in another jurisdiction” and

“all same-sex couples in Virginia who have
married in another jurisdiction,” excluding
the Plaintiffs.
Our analysis proceeds in three steps. First,
we consider whether the Plaintiffs possess
standing to bring their claims. Second, we
evaluate whether the Supreme Court's
summary dismissal of a similar lawsuit
in Baker v. Nelson remains binding. Third,
we determine which level of constitutional
scrutiny applies here and test the Virginia
Marriage Laws using the appropriate
standard. For purposes of this opinion, we
adopt the terminology the district court used
to describe the parties in this case. The
Plaintiffs, Rainey, and the Harris class are
the “Opponents” of the Virginia Marriage
Laws. Schaefer and McQuigg are the
“Proponents.”
II.
Before we turn to the merits of the parties'
arguments in this case, we consider
Schaefer's contention that “[t]he trial court
erred as a matter of law when it found all
Plaintiffs had standing and asserted claims
against all Defendants.” We review the
district court's disposition of cross-motions
for summary judgment-including its
determinations regarding standing-de novo,
viewing the facts in the light most favorable
to the non-moving party. Summary
judgment is appropriate when “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and
the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.”
To establish standing under Article III of the
Constitution, a plaintiff must “allege (1) an
injury that is (2) fairly traceable to the
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defendant's allegedly unlawful conduct and
that is (3) likely to be redressed by the
requested relief.” The standing requirement
applies to each claim that a plaintiff seeks to
press. Schaefer premises his argument that
the Plaintiffs lack standing to bring their
claims on the idea that every plaintiff must
have standing as to every defendant.
However, the Supreme Court has made it
clear that “the presence of one party with
standing is sufficient to satisfy Article Ill's
case-or-controversy requirement.” The
Plaintiffs' claims can therefore survive
Schaefer's standing challenge as long as one
couple satisfies the standing requirements
with respect to each defendant.
Schaefer serves as the Clerk for the Circuit
Court for the City of Norfolk. In Virginia,
circuit court clerks are responsible for
issuing marriage licenses and filing records
of marriage. Although Schall and Townley
did not seek a marriage license from
Schaefer, the district court found that Bostic
and London did so and that Schaefer denied
their request because they are a same-sex
couple. This license denial constitutes an
injury for standing purposes. Bostic and
London can trace this denial to Schaefer's
enforcement
of
the
allegedly
unconstitutional
Virginia
Marriage
Laws, and
declaring
those
laws
unconstitutional
and enjoining their
enforcement would redress Bostic and
London's injuries. Bostic and London
therefore possess Article III standing with
respect to Schaefer. We consequently need
not consider whether Schall and Townley
have standing to sue Schaefer.

Rainey-as the Registrar of Vital Records-is
tasked with developing Virginia's marriage
license application form and distributing it
to the circuit court clerks throughout
Virginia. Neither Schaefer's nor Rainey's
response to the First Amended Complaint
disputes its description of Rainey's duties.
In addition to performing these marriagerelated functions, Rainey develops and
distributes birth certificate forms, oversees
the rules relating to birth certificates, and
furnishes forms relating to adoption so that
Virginia can collect the information
necessary to prepare the adopted child's
birth certificate.
Rainey's promulgation of a marriage license
application form that does not allow samesex couples to obtain marriage licenses
resulted in Schaefer's denial of Bostic and
London's marriage license request. For the
reasons we describe above, this license
denial constitutes an injury. Bostic and
London can trace this injury to Rainey due
to her role in developing the marriage
license application form in compliance with
the Virginia Marriage Laws, and the relief
they seek would redress their injuries. Bostic
and London consequently have standing to
sue Rainey.
Schall and Townley also possess standing to
bring their claims against Rainey. They
satisfy the injury requirement in two ways.
First, in equal protection cases-such as this
case—“[w]hen the government erects a
barrier that makes it more difficult for
members of one group to obtain a benefit
than it is for members of another group, ....
[t]he ‘injury in fact’ ... is the denial of equal
treatment resulting from the imposition of
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the barrier[.]” The Virginia Marriage Laws
erect such a barrier, which prevents samesex couples from obtaining the emotional,
social, and financial benefits that oppositesex couples realize upon marriage. Second,
Schall and Townley allege that they have
suffered stigmatic injuries due to their
inability to get married in Virginia and
Virginia's refusal to recognize their
California marriage. Stigmatic injury
stemming from discriminatory treatment is
sufficient to satisfy standing's injury
requirement if the plaintiff identifies “some
concrete interest with respect to which [he
or she] [is] personally subject to
discriminatory treatment” and “[t]hat
interest independently satisf[ies] the
causation requirement of standing doctrine.”
Schall and Townley point to several
concrete ways in which the Virginia
Marriage
Laws
have
resulted
in
discriminatory treatment. For example, they
allege that their marital status has hindered
Schall from visiting Townley in the hospital,
prevented Schall from adopting E. S.-T., and
subjected Schall and Townley to tax burdens
from which married opposite-sex couples
are exempt. Because Schall and Townley
highlight specific, concrete instances of
discrimination rather than making abstract
allegations, their stigmatic injuries are
legally cognizable.
Schall and Townley's injuries are traceable
to Rainey's enforcement of the Virginia
Marriage Laws. Because declaring the
Virginia Marriage Laws unconstitutional
and enjoining their enforcement would
redress Schall and Townley's injuries, they
satisfy
standing
doctrine's
three
requirements with respect to Rainey. In sum,

each of the Plaintiffs has standing as to at
least one defendant.
III.
We now turn to the merits of the Opponents'
Fourteenth Amendment arguments. We
begin with the issue of whether the Supreme
Court's summary dismissal in Baker v.
Nelson settles this case. Baker came to the
Supreme Court as an appeal from a
Minnesota Supreme Court decision, which
held that a state statute that the court
interpreted to bar same-sex marriages did
not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's Due
Process or Equal Protection Clauses. At the
time, 28 U.S.C. § 1257 required the
Supreme Court to accept appeals of state
supreme court cases involving constitutional
challenges to state statutes, such as Baker.
The Court dismissed the appeal in a onesentence opinion “for want of a substantial
federal question.”
Summary dismissals qualify as “votes on the
merits of a case.” They therefore “prevent
lower courts from coming to opposite
conclusions on the precise issues presented
and necessarily decided.” However, the fact
that Baker and the case at hand address the
same precise issues does not end our
inquiry. Summary dismissals lose their
binding
force
when
“doctrinal
developments” illustrate that the Supreme
Court no longer views a question as
unsubstantial, regardless of whether the
Court explicitly overrules the case. The
district court determined that doctrinal
developments stripped Baker of its status as
binding precedent. Every federal court to
consider this issue since the Supreme Court
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decided United States v. Windsor
reached the same conclusion.

has

Windsor concerned whether section 3 of the
federal Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA)
contravened the Constitution's due process
and equal protection guarantees. Section 3
defined “marriage” and “spouse” as
excluding same-sex couples when those
terms appeared in federal statutes,
regulations, and directives, rendering legally
married same-sex couples ineligible for
myriad federal benefits. When it decided the
case below, the Second Circuit concluded
that Baker was no longer precedential over
the dissent's vigorous arguments to the
contrary. Despite this dispute, the Supreme
Court did not discuss Baker in its opinion or
during oral argument.
The Supreme Court's willingness to
decide Windsor
without
mentioning Baker speaks volumes regarding
whether Baker remains good law. The
Court's development of its due process and
equal protection jurisprudence in the four
decades following Baker is even more
instructive.
On
the
Due
Process
front, Lawrence v. Texas and Windsor are
particularly relevant. In Lawrence, the Court
recognized that the Due Process Clauses of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
“afford constitutional protection to personal
decisions relating to marriage, procreation,
contraception, family relationships, child
rearing, and education.... Persons in a
homosexual
relationship
may
seek
autonomy for these purposes, just as
heterosexual
persons
do.”
These
considerations led the Court to strike down a
Texas statute that criminalized same-sex

sodomy. The Windsor Court based its
decision to invalidate section 3 of DOMA
on the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause. The Court concluded that section 3
could not withstand constitutional scrutiny
because “the principal purpose and the
necessary effect of [section 3] are to demean
those persons who are in a lawful same-sex
marriage,” who-like the unmarried same-sex
couple in Lawrence—have a constitutional
right to make “moral and sexual choices.”
These cases firmly position same-sex
relationships within the ambit of the Due
Process Clauses' protection.
The Court has also issued several major
equal protection decisions since it decided
Baker. The Court's opinions in Craig v.
Boren
and Frontiero
v.
Richardson
identified sex-based classifications as quasisuspect, causing them to warrant
intermediate scrutiny rather than rational
basis review. Two decades later, in Romer v.
Evans, the Supreme Court struck down a
Colorado constitutional amendment that
prohibited legislative, executive, and judicial
action aimed at protecting gay, lesbian, and
bisexual individuals from discrimination.
The Court concluded that the law violated
the
Fourteenth
Amendment's
Equal
Protection Clause because “its sheer breadth
is so discontinuous with the reasons offered
for it that the amendment seems inexplicable
by anything but animus toward the class it
affects,” causing the law to “lack[ ] a
rational relationship to legitimate state
interests.” Finally, the Supreme Court
couched its decision in Windsor in both due
process and equal protection terms. These
cases demonstrate that, since Baker, the
Court has meaningfully altered the way it
522

views both sex and sexual orientation
through the equal protection lens.

whether that right encompasses the right to
same-sex marriage.

In light of the Supreme Court's apparent
abandonment of Baker and the significant
doctrinal developments that occurred after
the Court issued its summary dismissal in
that case, we decline to view Baker as
binding precedent and proceed to the meat
of the Opponents' Fourteenth Amendment
arguments.

Relying on Washington v. Glucksberg, the
Proponents aver that the district court erred
by not requiring “a careful description of the
asserted fundamental liberty interest,” which
they characterize as the right to “marriage to
another person of the same sex,” not the
right to marry. In Glucksberg, the Supreme
Court described the right at issue as “a right
to commit suicide with another's assistance.”
The Court declined to categorize this right
as a new fundamental right because it was
not, “objectively, deeply rooted in this
Nation's history and tradition.” The
Proponents urge us to reject the right to
same-sex marriage for the same reason.

IV.
A.
Our analysis of the Opponents' Fourteenth
Amendment claims has two components.
First, we ascertain what level of
constitutional scrutiny applies: either
rational basis review or some form of
heightened scrutiny, such as strict scrutiny.
Second, we apply the appropriate level of
scrutiny to determine whether the Virginia
Marriage Laws pass constitutional muster.
Under both the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses, interference with a
fundamental right warrants the application
of strict scrutiny. We therefore begin by
assessing whether the Virginia Marriage
Laws infringe on a fundamental right.
Fundamental rights spring from the
Fourteenth Amendment's protection of
individual liberty, which the Supreme Court
has described as “the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the
universe, and of the mystery of human life.”
This liberty includes the fundamental right
to marry.
The Opponents and Proponents agree that
marriage is a fundamental right. They
strongly disagree, however, regarding

We do not dispute that states have refused to
permit same-sex marriages for most of our
country's history. However, this fact is
irrelevant in this case because Glucksberg 's
analysis applies only when courts consider
whether to recognize new fundamental
rights. Because we conclude that the
fundamental right to marry encompasses the
right to same-sex marriage, Glucksberg 's
analysis is inapplicable here.
Over the decades, the Supreme Court has
demonstrated that the right to marry is an
expansive liberty interest that may stretch to
accommodate changing societal norms.
Perhaps most notably, in Loving v.
Virginia, the Supreme Court invalidated a
Virginia law that prohibited white
individuals from marrying individuals of
other races. The Court explained that “[t]he
freedom to marry has long been recognized
as one of the vital personal rights essential to
the orderly pursuit of happiness by free
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men” and that no valid basis justified the
Virginia law's infringement of that right.
Subsequently, in Zablocki v. Redhail, the
Supreme
Court
considered
the
constitutionality of a Wisconsin statute that
required people obligated to pay child
support to obtain a court order granting
permission to marry before they could
receive a marriage license. The statute
specified that a court should grant
permission only to applicants who proved
that they had complied with their child
support obligations and demonstrated that
their children were not likely to become
“public charges.” The Court held that the
statute impermissibly infringed on the right
to marry. Finally, in Turner v. Safley, the
Court determined that a Missouri regulation
that generally prohibited prison inmates
from marrying was an unconstitutional
breach of the right to marry.
These cases do not define the rights in
question as “the right to interracial
marriage,” “the right of people owing child
support to marry,” and “the right of prison
inmates to marry.” Instead, they speak of a
broad right to marry that is not
circumscribed based on the characteristics of
the individuals seeking to exercise that right.
The Supreme Court's unwillingness to
constrain the right to marry to certain
subspecies of marriage meshes with its
conclusion that the right to marry is a matter
of “freedom of choice” that “resides with the
individual.” If courts limited the right to
marry to certain couplings, they would
effectively create a list of legally preferred
spouses, rendering the choice of whom to
marry a hollow choice indeed.

The Proponents point out that Loving,
Zablocki, and Turner each
involved
opposite-sex couples. They contend that,
because the couples in those cases chose to
enter opposite-sex marriages, we cannot use
them to conclude that the Supreme Court
would grant the same level of constitutional
protection to the choice to marry a person of
the same sex. However, the Supreme Court's
decisions in Lawrence and Windsor suggest
otherwise. In Lawrence, the Court expressly
refused to narrowly define the right at issue
as the right of “homosexuals to engage in
sodomy,” concluding that doing so would
constitute a “failure to appreciate the extent
of the liberty at stake.” Just as it has done in
the right-to-marry arena, the Court identified
the right at issue in Lawrence as a matter of
choice, explaining that gay and lesbian
individuals-like all people—enjoy the right
to make decisions regarding their personal
relationships. As we note above, the Court
reiterated this theme in Windsor, in which it
based its conclusion that section 3 of
DOMA was unconstitutional, in part, on that
provision's disrespect for the “moral and
sexual choices” that accompany a same-sex
couple's
decision
to
marry.
Lawrence and Windsor indicate that the
choices that individuals make in the context
of same-sex relationships enjoy the same
constitutional protection as the choices
accompanying opposite-sex relationships.
We therefore have no reason to suspect that
the Supreme Court would accord the choice
to marry someone of the same sex any less
respect than the choice to marry an oppositesex individual who is of a different race,
owes
child
support,
or
is
imprisoned. Accordingly, we decline the
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Proponents' invitation to characterize the
right at issue in this case as the right to
same-sex marriage rather than simply the
right to marry.
Of
course,
“[b]y
reaffirming
the
fundamental character of the right to marry,
we do not mean to suggest that every state
regulation which relates in any way to the
incidents of or prerequisites for marriage
must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny.”
Strict scrutiny applies only when laws
“significantly interfere” with a fundamental
right. The Virginia Marriage Laws
unquestionably satisfy this requirement: they
impede the right to marry by preventing
same-sex couples from marrying and
nullifying the legal import of their out-ofstate marriages. Strict scrutiny therefore
applies in this case.
B.
Under strict scrutiny, a law “may be justified
only by compelling state interests, and must
be narrowly drawn to express only those
interests.” The Proponents bear the burden
of demonstrating that the Virginia Marriage
Laws satisfy this standard, and they must
rely on the laws' “actual purpose[s]” rather
than hypothetical justifications. The
Proponents contend that five compelling
interests undergird the Virginia Marriage
Laws: (1) Virginia's federalism-based
interest in maintaining control over the
definition of marriage within its borders, (2)
the history and tradition of opposite-sex
marriage, (3) protecting the institution of
marriage, (4) encouraging responsible
procreation, and (5) promoting the optimal
childrearing environment. We discuss each
of these interests in turn.

1. Federalism
The Constitution does not grant the federal
government any authority over domestic
relations matters, such as marriage.
Accordingly, throughout our country's
history, states have enjoyed the freedom to
define and regulate marriage as they see fit.
States' control over marriage laws within
their borders has resulted in some variation
among states' requirements. For example,
West Virginia prohibits first cousins from
marrying, but the remaining states in this
Circuit allow first cousin marriage. States'
power to define and regulate marriage also
accounts for their differing treatment of
same-sex couples.
The Windsor decision rested in part on the
Supreme Court's respect for states'
supremacy in the domestic relations
sphere. The Court recognized that section 3
of DOMA upset the status quo by robbing
states of their ability to define marriage.
Although states could legalize same-sex
marriage, they could not ensure that the
incidents, benefits, and obligations of
marriage would be uniform within their
borders. However, the Court did not lament
that section 3 had usurped states' authority
over marriage due to its desire to safeguard
federalism. Its concern sprung from section
3's creation of two classes of married
couples within states that had legalized
same-sex marriage: opposite-sex couples,
whose marriages the federal government
recognized, and same-sex couples, whose
marriages the federal government ignored.
The resulting injury to same-sex couples
served as the foundation for the Court's
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conclusion that section 3 violated the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Citing Windsor, the Proponents urge us to
view Virginia's federalism-based interest in
defining marriage as a suitable justification
for the Virginia Marriage Laws. However,
Windsor is actually detrimental to their
position. Although the Court emphasized
states' traditional authority over marriage, it
acknowledged that “[s]tate laws defining
and regulating marriage, of course, must
respect the constitutional rights of persons.”
Windsor does not teach us that federalism
principles can justify depriving individuals
of
their
constitutional
rights;
it
reiterates Loving 's admonition that the
states must exercise their authority without
trampling
constitutional
guarantees.
Virginia's federalism-based interest in
defining marriage therefore cannot justify its
encroachment on the fundamental right to
marry.
The Supreme Court's recent decision
in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend
Affirmative Action does not change the
conclusion
that Windsor dictates.
In Schuette, the Court refused to strike down
a voter-approved state constitutional
amendment that barred public universities in
Michigan from using race-based preferences
as part of their admissions processes. The
Court declined to closely scrutinize the
amendment because it was not “used, or ...
likely to be used, to encourage infliction of
injury by reason of race.” Instead, the Court
dwelled on the need to respect the voters'
policy choice, concluding that “[i]t is
demeaning to the democratic process to
presume that the voters are not capable of

deciding an issue of this sensitivity on
decent and rational grounds” and the
judiciary's role was not to “disempower the
voters from choosing which path to follow.”
The Proponents emphasize that Virginia's
voters approved the Marshall/Newman
Amendment. Like the Michigan amendment
at issue in Schuette, the Marshall/Newman
Amendment is the codification of
Virginians' policy choice in a legal arena
that is fraught with intense social and
political debate. Americans' ability to speak
with their votes is essential to our
democracy. But the people's will is not an
independent compelling interest that
warrants depriving same-sex couples of their
fundamental right to marry.
Accordingly, neither Virginia's federalismbased interest in defining marriage nor our
respect for the democratic process that
codified that definition can excuse the
Virginia Marriage Laws' infringement of the
right to marry.
2. History and Tradition
The Proponents also point to the “history
and tradition” of opposite-sex marriage as a
compelling interest that supports the
Virginia Marriage Laws. The Supreme
Court has made it clear that, even under
rational basis review, the “[a]ncient lineage
of a legal concept does not give it immunity
from attack.” The closely linked interest of
promoting moral principles is similarly
infirm in light of Lawrence: “the fact that
the governing majority in a State has
traditionally viewed a particular practice as
immoral is not a sufficient reason for
upholding a law prohibiting the practice;
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neither history nor tradition could save a law
prohibiting
miscegenation
from
constitutional attack.” Preserving the
historical and traditional status quo is
therefore not a compelling interest that
justifies the Virginia Marriage Laws.
3. Safeguarding
Marriage

the

Institution

of

procreate and articulated a view of marriage
that has nothing to do with children.
The fact that marriage's stabilizing norms
have endured in the five decades since the
Supreme Court made this pronouncement
weakens the argument that couples remain
in monogamous marriages only for the sake
of their offspring.

In addition to arguing that history and
tradition are compelling interests in their
own rights, the Proponents warn that
deviating from the tradition of opposite-sex
marriage will destabilize the institution of
marriage. The Proponents suggest that
legalizing same-sex marriage will sever the
link between marriage and procreation: they
argue that, if same-sex couples who cannot
procreate naturally-are allowed to marry, the
state will sanction the idea that marriage is a
vehicle for adults' emotional fulfillment, not
simply a framework for parenthood.
According to the Proponents, if adults are
the focal point of marriage, “then no logical
grounds reinforce stabilizing norms like
sexual exclusivity, permanence, and
monogamy,” which exist to benefit children.

Second, the primary support that the
Proponents offer for their theory is the
legacy of a wholly unrelated legal change to
marriage: no-fault divorce. Although nofault divorce certainly altered the realities of
married life by making it easier for couples
to end their relationships, we have no reason
to think that legalizing same-sex marriage
will have a similar destabilizing effect. In
fact, it is more logical to think that same-sex
couples want access to marriage so that they
can take advantage of its hallmarks,
including faithfulness and permanence, and
that allowing loving, committed same-sex
couples to marry and recognizing their outof-state marriages will strengthen the
institution of marriage. We therefore reject
the Proponents' concerns.

We recognize that, in some cases, we owe
“substantial deference to the predictive
judgments” of the Virginia General
Assembly, for whom the Proponents purport
to speak. However, even if we view the
Proponents' theories through rose-colored
glasses, we conclude that they are
unfounded for two key reasons. First, the
Supreme Court rejected the view that
marriage is about only procreation
in Griswold v. Connecticut, in which it
upheld married couples' right not to

4. Responsible Procreation
Next, the Proponents contend that the
Virginia Marriage Laws' differentiation
between opposite-sex and same-sex couples
stems from the fact that unintended
pregnancies cannot result from same-sex
unions. By sanctioning only opposite-sex
marriages, the Virginia Marriage Laws
“provid[e] stability to the types of
relationships that result in unplanned
pregnancies,
thereby
avoiding
or
diminishing the negative outcomes often
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associated with unintended children.” The
Proponents allege that children born to
unwed parents face a “significant risk” of
being raised in unstable families, which is
harmful to their development. Virginia, “of
course, has a duty of the highest order to
protect the interests of minor children,
particularly those of tender years.”
However, the Virginia Marriage Laws are
not appropriately tailored to further this
interest.
If Virginia sought to ensure responsible
procreation via the Virginia Marriage Laws,
the laws are woefully underinclusive. Samesex couples are not the only category of
couples who cannot reproduce accidentally.
For example, opposite-sex couples cannot
procreate unintentionally if they include a
post-menopausal woman or an individual
with a medical condition that prevents
unassisted conception.
The Proponents attempt to downplay the
similarity between same-sex couples and
infertile opposite-sex couples in three ways.
First, they point out that sterile individuals
could remedy their fertility through future
medical advances. This potentiality,
however, does not explain why Virginia
should treat same-sex and infertile oppositesex couples differently during the course of
the latter group's infertility. Second, the
Proponents posit that, even if one member of
a man-woman couple is sterile, the other
member may not be. They suggest that,
without marriage's monogamy mandate, this
fertile individual is more likely to have an
unintended child with a third party. They
contend that, due to this possibility, even
opposite-sex couples who cannot procreate

need marriage to channel their procreative
activity in a way that same-sex couples do
not. The Proponents' argument assumes that
individuals in same-sex relationships never
have opposite-sex sexual partners, which is
simply not the case. Third, the Proponents
imply that, by marrying, infertile oppositesex couples set a positive example for
couples who can have unintended children,
thereby encouraging them to marry. We see
no reason why committed same-sex couples
cannot serve as similar role models. We
therefore reject the Proponents' attempts to
differentiate same-sex couples from other
couples
who
cannot
procreate
accidentally. Because same-sex couples and
infertile opposite-sex couples are similarly
situated, the Equal Protection Clause
counsels against treating these groups
differently.
Due to the Virginia Marriage Laws'
underinclusivity, this case resembles City of
Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center,
Inc. In City of Cleburne, the Supreme Court
struck down a city law that required group
homes for the intellectually disabled to
obtain a special use permit. The city did not
impose the same requirement on similar
structures, such as apartment complexes and
nursing homes. The Court determined that
the
permit
requirement
was
so
underinclusive that the city's motivation
must have “rest[ed] on an irrational
prejudice,”
rendering
the
law
unconstitutional. In light of the Virginia
Marriage Laws' extreme underinclusivity,
we are forced to draw the same conclusion
in this case.
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The Proponents' responsible procreation
argument falters for another reason as well.
Strict scrutiny requires that a state's means
further its compelling interest. Prohibiting
same-sex couples from marrying and
ignoring their out-of-state marriages does
not serve Virginia's goal of preventing outof-wedlock births. Although same-sex
couples cannot procreate accidentally, they
can and do have children via other methods.
According to an amicus brief filed by Dr.
Gary J. Gates, as of the 2010 U.S. Census,
more than 2500 same-sex couples were
raising more than 4000 children under the
age of eighteen in Virginia. The Virginia
Marriage Laws therefore increase the
number of children raised by unmarried
parents.
The Proponents acknowledge that same-sex
couples become parents. They contend,
however, that the state has no interest in
channeling same-sex couples' procreative
activities into marriage because same-sex
couples “bring children into their
relationship[s] only through intentional
choice
and
pre-planned
action.”
Accordingly, “[t]hose couples neither
advance nor threaten society's public
purpose for marriage”—stabilizing parental
relationships for the benefit of children—“in
the same manner, or to the same degree, that
sexual relationships between men and
women do.”
In support of this argument, the Proponents
invoke the Supreme Court's decision in
Johnson v. Robison. Johnson concerned
educational benefits that the federal
government granted to military veterans
who served on active duty. The government

provided these benefits to encourage
enlistment and make military service more
palatable to existing service members. A
conscientious objector-who refused to serve
in the military for religious reasons-brought
suit, contending that the government acted
unconstitutionally by granting benefits to
veterans but not conscientious objectors.
The Court explained that, “[w]hen, as in this
case, the inclusion of one group promotes a
legitimate governmental purpose, and the
addition of other groups would not, we
cannot say that the statute's classification of
beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries is
invidiously
discriminatory.”
Because
offering
educational
benefits
to
conscientious
objectors
would
not
incentivize military service, the federal
government's
line-drawing
was
constitutional. The Proponents claim that
treating opposite-sex couples differently
from same-sex couples is equally justified
because the two groups are not similarly
situated with respect to their procreative
potential.
Johnson applied rational basis review, so we
strongly doubt its applicability to our strict
scrutiny analysis. In any event, we can
easily distinguish Johnson from the instant
case.
In Johnson, offering
educational
benefits to veterans who served on active
duty promoted the government's goal of
making military service more attractive.
Extending those benefits to conscientious
objectors, whose religious beliefs precluded
military service, did not further that
objective. By contrast, a stable marital
relationship is attractive regardless of a
couple's procreative ability. Allowing
infertile opposite-sex couples to marry does
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nothing to further the government's goal of
channeling procreative conduct into
marriage. Thus, excluding same-sex couples
from marriage due to their inability to have
unintended
children
makes
little
sense. Johnson therefore does not alter our
conclusion that barring same-sex couples'
access to marriage does nothing to further
Virginia's interest in responsible procreation.
5. Optimal Childrearing
We now shift to discussing the merit of the
final compelling interest that the Proponents
invoke:
optimal
childrearing.
The
Proponents aver that “children develop best
when reared by their married biological
parents in a stable family unit.” They dwell
on the importance of “gender-differentiated
parenting” and argue that sanctioning samesex marriage will deprive children of the
benefit of being raised by a mother and a
father, who have “distinct parenting styles.”
In essence, the Proponents argue that the
Virginia Marriage Laws safeguard children
by preventing same-sex couples from
marrying and starting inferior families.
The Opponents and their amici cast serious
doubt on the accuracy of the Proponents'
contentions. For example, as the American
Psychological
Association,
American
Academy
of
Pediatrics,
American
Psychiatric
Association,
National
Association of Social Workers, and Virginia
Psychological Association (collectively, the
APA) explain in their amicus brief, “there is
no scientific evidence that parenting
effectiveness is related to parental sexual
orientation,” and “the same factors”—
including family stability, economic
resources, and the quality of parent-child

relationships—“are linked to children's
positive development, whether they are
raised by heterosexual, lesbian, or gay
parents.” According to the APA, “the
parenting abilities of gay men and
lesbians—and the positive outcomes for
their children—are not areas where most
credible scientific researchers disagree,” and
the contrary studies that the Proponents cite
“do not reflect the current state of scientific
knowledge.” In fact, the APA explains that,
by preventing same-sex couples from
marrying, the Virginia Marriage Laws
actually harm the children of same-sex
couples by stigmatizing their families and
robbing them of the stability, economic
security, and togetherness that marriage
fosters. The Supreme Court reached a
similar conclusion in Windsor, in which it
observed that failing to recognize same-sex
marriages “humiliates tens of thousands of
children now being raised by same-sex
couples” and “makes it even more difficult
for the children to understand the integrity
and closeness of their own family and its
concord with other families in their
community and in their daily lives.”
We find the arguments that the Opponents
and their amici make on this issue extremely
persuasive. However, we need not resolve
this dispute because the Proponents' optimal
childrearing argument falters for at least two
other reasons. First, under heightened
scrutiny, states cannot support a law using
“overbroad generalizations about the
different talents, capacities, or preferences
of” the groups in question. The Proponents'
statements regarding same-sex couples'
parenting ability certainly qualify as
overbroad generalizations. Second, as we
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explain above, strict scrutiny requires
congruity between a law's means and its
end. This congruity is absent here. There is
absolutely no reason to suspect that
prohibiting same-sex couples from marrying
and refusing to recognize their out-of-state
marriages will cause same-sex couples to
raise fewer children or impel married
opposite-sex couples to raise more children.
The Virginia Marriage Laws therefore do
not further Virginia's interest in channeling
children into optimal families, even if we
were to accept the dubious proposition that
same-sex couples are less capable parents.
Because the Proponents' arguments are
based on overbroad generalizations about
same-sex parents, and because there is no
link between banning same-sex marriage
and promoting optimal childrearing, this aim
cannot support the Virginia Marriage Laws.
All of the Proponents' justifications for the
Virginia Marriage Laws therefore fail, and
the laws cannot survive strict scrutiny.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that
the Virginia Marriage Laws violate the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment to the extent that
they prevent same-sex couples from
marrying and prohibit Virginia from
recognizing same-sex couples' lawful outof-state marriages. We therefore affirm the
district court's grant of the Plaintiffs' motion
for summary judgment and its decision to
enjoin enforcement of the Virginia Marriage
Laws.
We recognize that same-sex marriage makes
some people deeply uncomfortable.

However, inertia and apprehension are not
legitimate bases for denying same-sex
couples due process and equal protection of
the laws. Civil marriage is one of the
cornerstones of our way of life. It allows
individuals to celebrate and publicly declare
their intentions to form lifelong partnerships,
which provide unparalleled intimacy,
companionship, emotional support, and
security. The choice of whether and whom
to marry is an intensely personal decision
that alters the course of an individual's life.
Denying same-sex couples this choice
prohibits them from participating fully in
our society, which is precisely the type of
segregation that the Fourteenth Amendment
cannot countenance.
AFFIRMED
NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:
To be clear, this case is not about whether
courts favor or disfavor same-sex marriage,
or whether States recognizing or declining to
recognize same-sex marriage have made
good policy decisions. It is much narrower.
It is about whether a State's decision not to
recognize same-sex marriage violates the
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution. Thus, the judicial response
must be limited to an analysis applying
established constitutional principles.
The Commonwealth of Virginia has always
recognized that “marriage” is based on the
“mutual agreement of a man and a woman to
marry each other,” and that a marriage's
purposes include “establishing a family, the
continuance of the race, the propagation of
children, and the general good of society.”
In recent years, it codified that
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understanding in several statutes, which also
explicitly exclude from the definition of
“marriage” the union of two men or two
women. Moreover, in 2006 the people of
Virginia amended the Commonwealth's
Constitution to define marriage as only
between “one man and one woman.”
The plaintiffs, who are in long-term samesex relationships, are challenging the
constitutionality of Virginia's marriage laws
under the Due Process and Equal Protection
Clauses of the U.S. Constitution. The district
court sustained their challenge, concluding
that the plaintiffs have a fundamental
right to marry each other under the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment and therefore that any
regulation of that right is subject to strict
scrutiny. Concluding that Virginia's
definition of marriage failed even “to
display a rational relationship to a legitimate
purpose and so must be viewed as
constitutionally infirm,” the court struck
down Virginia's marriage laws as
unconstitutional
and
enjoined
their
enforcement.
The majority agrees. It concludes that the
fundamental right to marriage includes a
right to same-sex marriage and that therefore
Virginia's marriage laws must be reviewed
under strict scrutiny. It holds that Virginia
has failed to advance a compelling state
interest justifying its definition of marriage
as between only a man and a woman. In
reaching this conclusion, however, the
majority has failed to conduct the necessary
constitutional analysis. Rather, it has simply
declared syllogistically that because
“marriage” is a fundamental right protected

by the Due Process Clause and “same-sex
marriage” is a form of marriage, Virginia's
laws declining to recognize same-sex
marriage infringe the fundamental right to
marriage and are therefore unconstitutional.
Stated more particularly, the majority's
approach begins with the parties' agreement
that “marriage” is a fundamental right. From
there, the majority moves to the proposition
that “the right to marry is an expansive
liberty interest,” “that is not circumscribed
based on the characteristics of the
individuals seeking to exercise that right.”
For support, it notes that the Supreme Court
has struck down state restrictions prohibiting
interracial marriage; prohibiting prison
inmates from marrying without special
approval; and prohibiting persons owing
child support from marrying. It then
declares, ipse dixit, that “the fundamental
right to marry encompasses the right to
same-sex marriage” and is thus protected by
the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause. In reaching this conclusion,
the majority “decline[s] the Proponents'
invitation to characterize the right at issue in
this case as the right to same-sex marriage
rather than simply the right to marry.” And
in doing so, it explicitly bypasses the
relevant constitutional analysis required
by Washington v. Glucksberg, stating that
a Glucksberg analysis is not necessary
because no new fundamental right is being
recognized.
This analysis is fundamentally flawed
because it fails to take into account that the
“marriage” that has long been recognized by
the Supreme Court as a fundamental right is
distinct from the newly proposed
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relationship of a “same-sex marriage.” And
this failure is even more pronounced by the
majority's acknowledgment that same-sex
marriage is a new notion that has not been
recognized “for most of our country's
history.” Moreover, the majority fails to
explain how this new notion became
incorporated into the traditional definition of
marriage except by linguistic manipulation.
Thus, the majority never asks the question
necessary to finding a fundamental right—
whether same-sex marriage is a right that is
“deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition” and “implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty, such that neither liberty nor
justice would exist if [it was] sacrificed.”
At bottom, in holding that same-sex
marriage is encompassed by the traditional
right to marry, the majority avoids the
necessary constitutional analysis, concluding
simply and broadly that the fundamental
“right to marry”—by everyone and to
anyone—may not be infringed. And it does
not anticipate or address the problems that
this approach causes, failing to explain, for
example, why this broad right to marry, as
the majority defines it, does not also
encompass the “right” of a father to marry
his daughter or the “right” of any person to
marry multiple partners.
If the majority were to recognize and
address the distinction between the two
relationships—the traditional one and the
new one—as it must, it would simply be
unable to reach the conclusion that it has
reached.
I respectfully submit that Virginia was well
within its constitutional authority to adhere
to its traditional definition of marriage as the

union of a man and a woman and to exclude
from that definition the union of two men or
two women. I would also agree that the U.S.
Constitution does not prohibit a State from
defining marriage to include same-sex
marriage, as many States have done.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment
of the district court and uphold Virginia's
marriage laws.
I
As the majority has observed, state
recognition of same-sex marriage is a new
phenomenon. Its history began in the early
2000s with the recognition in some States of
civil unions. And the notion of same-sex
marriage itself first gained traction in 2003,
when the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court held that the Commonwealth's
prohibition on issuing marriage licenses to
same-sex couples violated the State's
Constitution-the first decision holding that
same-sex couples had a right to marry. In
2009, Vermont became the first State to
enact legislation recognizing same-sex
marriage, and, since then, 11 other States
and the District of Columbia have also done
so. Moreover, seven other States currently
allow same-sex marriage as a result of court
rulings. This is indeed a recent phenomenon.
Virginia only recognizes marriage as
between one man and one woman, and, like
a majority of States, it has codified this
view. The bill originally proposing what
would become § 20–45.3 noted the basis for
Virginia's legislative decision:
[H]uman marriage is a consummated
two in one communion of male and
female persons made possible by sexual
differences which are reproductive in
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type, whether or not they are
reproductive in effect or motivation.
This present relationship recognizes the
equality of male and female persons,
and antedates recorded history.
The bill predicted that the recognition of
same-sex marriage would “radically
transform the institution of marriage with
serious and harmful consequences to the
social order.” Virginia also amended its
Constitution in 2006 to define marriage as
only between “one man and one woman”
and to prohibit “a legal status for
relationships of unmarried individuals that
intends to approximate the design, qualities,
significance, or effects of marriage.” The
plaintiffs commenced this action to
challenge the constitutionality of Virginia's
marriage laws.
After the parties filed cross-motions for
summary judgment, Virginia underwent a
change in administrations, and the newly
elected Attorney General of Virginia, Mark
Herring, filed a notice of a change in his
office's legal position on behalf of his client,
defendant Janet Rainey. His notice stated
that because, in his view, the laws at issue
were unconstitutional, his office would no
longer defend them on behalf of Rainey. He
noted, however, that Rainey would continue
to enforce the laws until the court's ruling.
The other officials have continued to defend
Virginia's marriage laws, and, for
convenience, I refer to the defendants herein
as “Virginia .”
Following a hearing, the district court, by an
order and memorandum dated February 14,
2014, granted the plaintiffs' motion for
summary judgment and denied Virginia's
cross-motion. The court concluded that

same-sex partners have a fundamental right
to marry each other under the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, thus
requiring that Virginia's marriage laws
restricting that right be narrowly drawn to
further a compelling state interest. It
concluded that the laws did not meet that
requirement and, indeed, “fail[ed] to display
a rational relationship to a legitimate
purpose, and so must be viewed as
constitutionally infirm under even the least
onerous level of scrutiny.” Striking down
Virginia's marriage laws, the court also
issued an order enjoining their enforcement
but stayed that order pending appeal. This
appeal followed.
II
The plaintiffs contend that, as same-sex
partners, they have a fundamental right to
marry that is protected by the substantive
component of the Due Process Clause of the
U.S. Constitution, and that Virginia's laws
defining marriage as only between a man
and a woman and excluding same-sex
marriage infringe on that right. The
constitutional analysis for adjudging their
claim is well established.
The Constitution contains no language
directly protecting the right to same-sex
marriage or even traditional marriage. Any
right to same-sex marriage, therefore, would
have to be found, through court
interpretation, as a substantive component of
the Due Process Clause.
The substantive component of the Due
Process Clause only protects “fundamental”
liberty interests. And the Supreme Court has
held that liberty interests are only
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fundamental if they are, “objectively,
‘deeply rooted in this Nation's history and
tradition,’ and ‘implicit in the concept of
ordered liberty,’ such that ‘neither liberty
nor justice would exist if they were
sacrificed.’ ” When determining whether
such a fundamental right exists, a court must
always make “a ‘careful description’ of the
asserted fundamental liberty interest.” This
“careful description” involves characterizing
the right asserted in its narrowest
terms. Thus, in Glucksberg, where the Court
was presented with a due process challenge
to a state statute banning assisted suicide,
the Court narrowly characterized the right
being asserted in the following manner:
The Court of Appeals stated that
“[p]roperly analyzed, the first issue to
be resolved is whether there is a liberty
interest in determining the time and
manner of one's death,” or, in other
words, “[i]s there a right to die?”
Similarly, respondents assert a “liberty
to choose how to die” and a right to
“control of one's final days,” and
describe the asserted liberty as “the
right to choose a humane, dignified
death,” and “the liberty to shape death
.” As noted above, we have a tradition
of carefully formulating the interest at
stake
in
substantive-due-process
cases.... The Washington statute at issue
in this case prohibits “aid[ing] another
person to attempt suicide,” and, thus,
the question before us is whether the
“liberty” specially protected by the Due
Process Clause includes a right to
commit suicide which itself includes a
right to assistance in doing so.
Under this formulation, because the Virginia
laws at issue prohibit “marriage between
persons of the same sex,” “the question

before us is whether the ‘liberty’ specially
protected by the Due Process Clause
includes a right” to same-sex marriage.
When a fundamental right is so identified,
then any statute restricting the right is
subject to strict scrutiny and must be
“narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.” Such scrutiny is extremely
difficult for a law to withstand, and, as such,
the Supreme Court has noted that courts
must be extremely cautious in recognizing
fundamental rights because doing so
ordinarily removes freedom of choice from
the hands of the people.
The plaintiffs in this case, as well as the
majority, recognize that narrowly defining
the asserted liberty interest would require
them to demonstrate a new fundamental
right to same-sex marriage, which they
cannot do. Thus, they have made no attempt
to argue that same-sex marriage is,
“objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition,” and “implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty.” Indeed, they
have acknowledged that recognition of
same-sex marriage is a recent development.
Instead, the plaintiffs and the majority argue
that the fundamental right to marriage that
has previously been recognized by the
Supreme Court is a broad right that should
apply to the plaintiffs without the need to
recognize a new fundamental right to samesex marriage. They argue that this approach
is supported by the fact that the Supreme
Court did not narrowly define the right to
marriage in its decisions in Loving;
Turner; or Zablocki.
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It is true that, in those cases, the Court did
not recognize new, separate fundamental
rights to fit the factual circumstances in each
case. For example, in Loving, the Court did
not examine whether interracial marriage
was, objectively, deeply rooted in our
Nation's history and tradition. But it was not
required to do so. Each of those cases
involved a couple asserting a right to enter
into a traditional marriage of the type that
has always been recognized since the
beginning of the Nation-a union between
one man and one woman. While the context
for asserting the right varied in each of those
cases, it varied only in ways irrelevant to the
concept of marriage. The type of
relationship sought was always the
traditional, man-woman relationship to
which the term “marriage” was theretofore
always assumed to refer. Thus, none of the
cases cited by the plaintiffs and relied on by
the majority involved the assertion of a
brand new liberty interest. To the contrary,
they involved the assertion of one of the
oldest and most fundamental liberty interests
in our society.
To now define the previously recognized
fundamental right to “marriage” as a concept
that includes the new notion of “same-sex
marriage” amounts to a dictionary
jurisprudence, which defines terms as
convenient to attain an end.
Because there exist deep, fundamental
differences between traditional and samesex marriage, the plaintiffs and the majority
err by conflating the two relationships under
the loosely drawn rubric of “the right to
marriage.” Rather, to obtain constitutional
protection, they would have to show that the

right to same-sex marriage is itself deeply
rooted in our Nation's history. They have not
attempted to do so and could not succeed if
they were so to attempt.
In an effort to bridge the obvious differences
between the traditional relationship and the
new same-sex relationship, the plaintiffs
argue that the fundamental right to marriage
“has always been based on, and defined by,
the constitutional liberty to select the
partner of one's choice.” They rely heavily
on Loving to assert this claim. In Loving, the
Court held that a state regulation restricting
interracial marriage infringed on the
fundamental right to marriage. But nowhere
in Loving did the Court suggest that the
fundamental right to marry includes the
unrestricted right to marry whomever one
chooses,
as
the
plaintiffs
claim.
Indeed, Loving explicitly relied on Skinner
and Murphy, and both of those cases
discussed
marriage
in
traditional,
procreative terms.
This reading of Loving is fortified by the
Court's summary dismissal of Baker v.
Nelson just five years after Loving was
decided. In Baker, the Minnesota Supreme
Court interpreted a state statute's use of the
term “marriage” to be one of common usage
meaning a union “between persons of the
opposite sex” and thus not including samesex marriage. On appeal, the Supreme Court
dismissed the case summarily “for want of a
substantial federal question.” The Court's
action in context indicates that the Court did
not view Loving or the cases that preceded it
as providing a fundamental right to an
unrestricted choice of marriage partner.
Otherwise, the state court's decision
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in Baker would indeed have presented a
substantial federal question.
The plaintiffs also largely ignore the
problem with their position that if the
fundamental right to marriage is based on
“the constitutional liberty to select the
partner of one's choice,” as they contend,
then that liberty would also extend to
individuals seeking state recognition of
other types of relationships that States
currently restrict, such as polygamous or
incestuous relationships. Such an extension
would be a radical shift in our understanding
of marital relationships. Laws restricting
polygamy are foundational to the Union
itself, having been a condition on the
entrance of Arizona, New Mexico,
Oklahoma, and Utah into statehood. At
bottom, the fundamental right to marriage
does not include a right to same-sex
marriage. Under the Glucksberg analysis
that we are thus bound to conduct, there is
no new fundamental right to same-sex
marriage. Virginia's laws restricting
marriage to man-woman relationships must
therefore be upheld if there is any rational
basis for the laws.
III
Under rational-basis review, courts are
required to give heavy deference to
legislatures. The standard
simply requires courts to determine
whether the classification in question is,
at a minimum, rationally related to
legitimate governmental goals. In other
words, the fit between the enactment
and the public purposes behind it need
not be mathematically precise. As long
as [the legislature] has a reasonable

basis for adopting the classification,
which can include “rational speculation
unsupported by evidence or empirical
data,” the statute will pass constitutional
muster. The rational basis standard thus
embodies an idea critical to the
continuing vitality of our democracy:
that courts are not empowered to “sit as
a superlegislature to judge the wisdom
or desirability of legislative policy
determinations.”
Statutes subject to rational-basis review
“bear[ ] a strong presumption of
validity, and those attacking the
rationality
of
the
legislative
classification have the burden ‘to
negative every conceivable basis which
might support [them].’ ”
In contending that there is a rational basis
for its marriage laws, Virginia has
emphasized that children are born only to
one man and one woman and that marriage
provides a family structure by which to
nourish and raise those children. It claims
that a biological family is a more stable
environment, and it renounces any interest
in encouraging same-sex marriage. It argues
that the purpose of its marriage laws “is to
channel the presumptive procreative
potential of man-woman relationships into
enduring marital unions so that if any
children are born, they are more likely to be
raised in stable family units.” Virginia
highlights especially marriage's tendency to
promote stability in the event of unplanned
pregnancies, asserting that it has “a
compelling interest in addressing the
particular concerns associated with the birth
of unplanned children.... [C]hildren born
from unplanned pregnancies where their
mother and father are not married to each
other are at significant risk of being raised
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outside stable family units headed by their
mother and father jointly.”
Virginia states that its justifications for
promoting traditional marriage also explain
its lack of interest in promoting same-sex
marriage. It maintains that a traditional
marriage is “exclusively [an] opposite-sex
institution ... inextricably linked to
procreation and biological kinship,” and that
same-sex marriage prioritizes the emotions
and sexual attractions of the two partners
without any necessary link to reproduction.
It asserts that it has no interest in “licensing
adults' love.”
The plaintiffs accept that family stability is a
legitimate state goal, but they argue that
licensing same-sex relationships will not
burden Virginia's achievement of that goal.
They contend that “there is simply no
evidence or reason to believe that
prohibiting gay men and lesbians from
marrying
will
increase
‘responsible
procreation’ among heterosexuals.”
But this argument does not negate any of the
rational
justifications
for
Virginia's
legislation. States are permitted to
selectively provide benefits to only certain
groups when providing those same benefits
to other groups would not further the State's
ultimate goals.
The plaintiffs reply that even if this is so,
such “line-drawing” only makes sense if the
resources at issue are scarce, justifying the
State's limited provision of those resources.
They argue that because “[m]arriage
licenses ... are not a remotely scarce
commodity,” the line-drawing done by
Virginia's marriage laws is irrational. But

this fundamentally misunderstands the
nature of marriage benefits. When the
Commonwealth grants a marriage, it does
not simply give the couple a piece of paper
and a title. Rather, it provides a substantial
subsidy to the married couple—economic
benefits that, the plaintiffs repeatedly assert,
are being denied them. For example, married
couples are permitted to file state income
taxes jointly, lowering their tax rates.
Although indirect, such benefits are clearly
subsidies that come at a cost to the
Commonwealth. Virginia is willing to
provide these subsidies because they
encourage opposite-sex couples to marry,
which tends to provide children from
unplanned pregnancies with a more stable
environment. Under Johnson, the
Commonwealth is not obligated to similarly
subsidize same-sex marriages, since doing
so could not possibly further its interest.
This is no different from the subsidies
provided in other cases where the Supreme
Court has upheld line-drawing, such as
Medicare benefits or veterans' educational
benefits.
As an additional argument, Virginia
maintains that marriage is a “[c]omplex
social institution[ ]” with a “set of norms,
rules, patterns, and expectations that
powerfully (albeit often unconsciously)
affect people's choices, actions, and
perspectives.” It asserts that discarding the
traditional definition of marriage will have
far-reaching consequences that cannot easily
be predicted, including “sever[ing] the
inherent link between procreation ... and
marriage ... [and] in turn ... powerfully
convey [ing] that marriage exists to advance
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adult desires rather than [to] serv[e]
children's needs.”
The plaintiffs agree that changing the
definition of marriage may have unforeseen
social effects, but they argue that such
predictions should not be enough to save
Virginia's marriage laws because similar
justifications
were
rejected
in Loving. The Loving Court, however, was
not applying rational-basis review. We are
on a different footing here. Under rationalbasis review, legislative choices “may be
based on rational speculation unsupported
by evidence or empirical data.” “Sound
policymaking often requires legislators to
forecast future events and to anticipate the
likely impact of these events based on
deductions and inferences for which
complete empirical support may be
unavailable.” And the legislature “is far
better equipped than the judiciary” to make
these evaluations and ultimately decide on a
course of action based on its predictions. In
enacting its marriage laws, Virginia
predicted that changing the definition of
marriage would have a negative effect on
children and on the family structure.
Although other States do not share those
concerns, such evaluations were nonetheless
squarely within the province of the
Commonwealth's legislature and its citizens,
who voted to amend Virginia's Constitution
in 2006.
Virginia has undoubtedly articulated
sufficient rational bases for its marriage
laws, and I would find that those bases
constitutionally justify the laws. Those laws
are grounded on the biological connection of
men and women; the potential for their

having children; the family order needed in
raising children; and, on a larger scale, the
political order resulting from stable family
units. Moreover, I would add that the
traditional marriage relationship encourages
a family structure that is intergenerational,
giving children not only a structure in which
to be raised but also an identity and a strong
relational context. The marriage of a man
and a woman thus rationally promotes a
correlation between biological order and
political order. Because Virginia's marriage
laws are rationally related to its legitimate
purposes, they withstand rational-basis
scrutiny under the Due Process Clause.
IV
The majority does not substantively address
the plaintiffs' second argument—that
Virginia's marriage laws invidiously
discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation, in violation of the Equal
Protection Clause—since it finds that the
laws infringe on the plaintiffs' fundamental
right to marriage. But because I find no
fundamental right is infringed by the laws, I
also address discrimination under the Equal
Protection Clause.
The Equal Protection Clause, which forbids
any State from “deny[ing] to any person
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws,” prohibits invidious discrimination
among classes of persons. Any laws based
on “suspect” classifications are subject to
strict scrutiny. In a similar vein,
classifications based on gender are
“quasisuspect” and call for “intermediate
scrutiny” because they “frequently bear[ ] no
relation to ability to perform or contribute to
society” and thus “generally provide[ ] no
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sensible ground for differential treatment .”
Laws subject to intermediate scrutiny must
be substantially related to an important
government objective.
But when a regulation adversely affects
members of a class that is not suspect or
quasi-suspect, the regulation is “presumed to
be valid and will be sustained if the
classification drawn by the statute
is rationally related to a legitimate state
interest.” Moreover, the Supreme Court has
made it clear that
where individuals in the group affected
by
a
law
have distinguishing
characteristics relevant to interests the
State has the authority to implement, the
courts have been very reluctant, as they
should be in our federal system and
with our respect for the separation of
powers, to closely scrutinize legislative
choices as to whether, how, and to what
extent those interests should be pursued.
In such cases, the Equal Protection
Clause requires only a rational means to
serve a legitimate end.
This is based on the understanding that
“equal protection of the laws must coexist
with the practical necessity that most
legislation classifies for one purpose or
another, with resulting disadvantage to
various groups or persons.”
The plaintiffs contend that Virginia's
marriage laws should be subjected to some
level of heightened scrutiny because they
discriminate on the basis of sexual
orientation. Yet they concede that neither
the Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit
has ever applied heightened scrutiny to a
classification based on sexual orientation.
They urge this court to do so for the first

time. Governing
counsels otherwise.

precedent,

however,

And the Supreme Court made no change as
to the appropriate level of scrutiny in its
more recent decision in Windsor, which held
Section 3 of the Defense of Marriage Act
unconstitutional. The Court was presented
an opportunity to alter the Romer standard
but did not do so. Although it did not state
the level of scrutiny being applied, it did
explicitly rely on rational-basis cases
like Romer and Department of Agriculture v.
Moreno. In his dissenting opinion
in Windsor, Justice Scalia thus noted, “As
nearly as I can tell, the Court agrees [that
rational-basis review applies]; its opinion
does not apply strict scrutiny, and its central
propositions are taken from rational-basis
cases like Moreno.”
Finally, we have concluded that rationalbasis review applies to classifications based
on sexual orientation. In Veney, a prisoner
filed a § 1983 action alleging that he had
been discriminated against on the basis of
sexual preference and gender. We noted that
the plaintiff “[did] not allege that he [was] a
member of a suspect class. Rather, he
claim[ed] that he ha[d] been discriminated
against on the basis of sexual preference and
gender.” Outside the prison context, the
former is subject to rational basis review.
The vast majority of other courts of appeals
have reached the same conclusion.
Thus, following Supreme Court and Fourth
Circuit precedent, I would hold that
Virginia's marriage laws are subject to
rational-basis review. Applying that
standard, I conclude that there is a rational
540

basis for the laws, as explained in Part III,
above.
V
Whether to recognize same-sex marriage is
an ongoing and highly engaged political
debate taking place across the Nation, and
the States are divided on the issue. The
majority of courts have struck down statutes
that deny recognition of same-sex marriage,
doing so almost exclusively on the idea that
same-sex marriage is encompassed by the
fundamental right to marry that is protected
by the Due Process Clause. While I express
no viewpoint on the merits of the policy
debate, I do strongly disagree with the
assertion that same-sex marriage is subject
to the same constitutional protections as the
traditional right to marry.

Because there is no fundamental right to
same-sex marriage and there are rational
reasons for not recognizing it, just as there
are rational reasons for recognizing it, I
conclude that we, in the Third Branch, must
allow the States to enact legislation on the
subject in accordance with their political
processes. The U.S. Constitution does not, in
my judgment, restrict the States' policy
choices on this issue. If given the choice,
some States will surely recognize same-sex
marriage and some will surely not. But that
is, to be sure, the beauty of federalism.
I would reverse the district court's judgment
and defer to Virginia's political choice in
defining marriage as only between one man
and one woman.
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Kitchen v. Herbert
Ruling Below: Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F.Supp.2d 1181 (D. Utah 2013).
Three gay and lesbian couples who either desired to be married in Utah or, having already
married elsewhere, wished to have their marriage recognized in Utah, brought action against
Utah's Governor, Attorneys General, and county clerk, seeking to challenge amendment to Utah's
Constitution, as well as two statutes, that prohibited same-sex marriage as violative of same-sex
couples' due process and equal protection rights under Fourteenth Amendment. The United
States District Court for the District of Utah granted summary judgment for plaintiffs. The
Governor and Attorney General appealed.
Question Presented: Whether § 30–1–4.1 or the amendment to the Constitution of Utah, known
as Amendment 3, violate Plaintiffs’ right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment by
depriving them of the fundamental liberty to marry the person of their choice and to have such a
marriage recognized.

Derek KITCHEN; Moudi Sbeity; Karen Archer; Kate Call; Laurie Wood; Kody Partridge,
individually, Plaintiffs-Appelles,
v.
Gary R. HERBERT, in his official capacity as Governor of Utah; Sean Reyes, in his official
capacity as Attorney General of Utah, Defendants-Appellants,
and
Sherrie Swensen, in her official capacity as Clerk of Salt Lake County, Defendant.
United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit
Decided on June 25, 2014
[Excerpt; some footnotes and citations omitted.]
LUCERO, Circuit Judge.
Our commitment as Americans to the
principles of liberty, due process of law, and
equal protection of the laws is made live by
our adherence to the Constitution of the
United States of America. Historical
challenges to these principles ultimately
culminated in the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment nearly one-and-a-half centuries
ago. This Amendment extends the
guarantees of due process and equal
protection to every person in every State of

the Union. Those very principles are at issue
yet again in this marriage equality appeal
brought to us by the Governor and Attorney
General of the State of Utah from an adverse
ruling of the district court.
We are told that because they felt threatened
by state-court opinions allowing same-sex
marriage,
Utah
legislators
and—by
legislature—initiated action—the citizens of
the State of Utah amended their statutes and
state constitution in 2004 to ensure that the
State “will not recognize, enforce, or give
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legal effect to any law” that provides
“substantially equivalent” benefits to a
marriage between two persons of the same
sex as are allowed for two persons of the
opposite sex. These laws were also intended
to assure non-recognition irrespective of
how such a domestic union might be
denominated, or where it may have been
performed.
Plaintiffs challenged the
constitutionality of these laws and the
district court agreed with their position.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we entertain the
appeal of that ruling.
Our Circuit has not previously considered
the validity of same-sex marriage bans.
When the seed of that question was initially
presented to the United States Supreme
Court in 1972, the Court did not consider the
matter of such substantial moment as to
present a justiciable federal question. Since
that date, the seed has grown, however. Last
year the Court entertained the federal aspect
of the issue in striking down § 3 of the
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”), yet
left open the question presented to us now in
full bloom: May a State of the Union
constitutionally deny a citizen the benefit or
protection of the laws of the State based
solely upon the sex of the person that citizen
chooses to marry?
I
Utah residents Derek Kitchen and Moudi
Sbeity have been in a loving, committed
relationship for several years. The couple
lives together in Salt Lake City, where they
jointly own and operate a business. Kitchen
declares that Sbeity “is the man with whom I
have fallen in love, the man I want to marry,
and the man with whom I want to spend the

rest of my life.” In March 2013, Kitchen and
Sbeity applied for a marriage license from
the Salt Lake County Clerk's office, but
were denied because they are both
men. Being excluded from the institution of
marriage has caused Kitchen and Sbeity to
undertake a burdensome process of drawing
up wills and other legal documents to enable
them to make important decisions for each
other. Even with these protections, however,
the couple cannot access various benefits of
marriage, including the ability to file joint
state tax returns and hold marital property.
Sbeity also states that the legal documents
the couple have obtained “do not and cannot
provide the dignity, respect, and esteem” of
marriage. The inability to “dignify [his]
relationship” though marriage, Kitchen
explains, communicates to him that his
relationship with Sbeity is unworthy of
“respect, equal treatment, and social
recognition.”
Laurie Wood and Kody Partridge are also
Utah residents who wish to “confirm [their]
life commitment and love” through
marriage. They applied for a marriage
license from the Salt Lake County Clerk's
office in March 2013, but were denied
because they are both women. This denial
made Wood “feel like a second class
citizen.” The couple's inability to marry
carries financial consequences. Because
Partridge will be unable to obtain benefits
under Wood's pension, the couple has
procured additional life insurance policies.
Partridge states that she and Wood face
“risks and stigmas that none of [her]
heterosexual married friends and family ever
have to face.” She points to the example of
her parents, who were married for fifty-five
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years, observing that her father never had to
worry about his ability to be present or make
medical decisions when his wife became
terminally ill. Wood hopes that marriage to
Partridge will allow “both society and our
families [to] recognize the life commitment
and love we feel for each other.”
Karen Archer and Kate Call are also Utah
residents
in
a
loving,
committed
relationship. Archer, who suffers from
chronic health problems, fears that the legal
documents the couple has prepared will be
subject to challenge if she passes away. Her
past experience surviving other partners
informs this fear. Although the documents
she prepared in a prior relationship served
their purpose when her former partner
passed, Archer was ineligible to receive her
partner's military pension benefits. Seeking
the security enjoyed by other married
couples, Archer and Call travelled to Iowa in
July 2011, where they were wed. Because
they could not be married in their home
state, financial constraints dictated a modest
wedding unattended by family and friends.
“Despite the inconvenience and sad
pragmatism of our Iowa marriage,” Call
explains, “we needed whatever protections
and security we could get for our
relationship” because of Archer's failing
health. However, Utah does not recognize
Archer and Call's marriage.
In March 2013, Kitchen, Sbeity, Wood,
Partridge, Archer, and Call filed suit against
the Governor and Attorney General of Utah
and the Clerk of Salt Lake County (all in
their
official
capacities).
Plaintiffs
challenged three provisions of Utah law
relating to same-sex marriage. Utah Code §

30–1–2(5) includes among the marriages
that are “prohibited and declared void” those
“between persons of the same sex.” In
2004, the Utah Legislature passed § 30–1–
4.1, which provides:
(1)(a) It is the policy of this state to
recognize as marriage only the legal
union of a man and a woman as
provided in this chapter.
(b) Except for the relationship of
marriage between a man and a
woman recognized pursuant to this
chapter, this state will not recognize,
enforce, or give legal effect to any
law creating any legal status, rights,
benefits, or duties that are
substantially equivalent to those
provided under Utah law to a man
and a woman because they are
married.
(2) Nothing in Subsection (1)
impairs any contract or other rights,
benefits, or duties that are
enforceable independently of this
section.
The Legislature also referred a proposed
constitutional amendment, known as
Amendment 3, to Utah's voters. It states:
(1) Marriage consists only of the
legal union between a man and a
woman.
(2) No other domestic union,
however denominated, may be
recognized as a marriage or given the
same or substantially equivalent
legal effect.
The State's official voter pamphlet described
rulings by courts in other states striking
down statutory prohibitions on same-sex
marriage as inconsistent with state
constitutional provisions. In the “arguments
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for” section, written by a state representative
and a state senator, the proponents argued
that the Amendment was necessary to
protect against a similar state-court ruling.
They posited that the proposed amendment
would not “promote intolerance, hatred, or
bigotry” but would instead “preserve[an]
historic understanding of marriage” rooted
in “government's strong interest in
maintaining public morality, the justified
preference for heterosexual marriage with its
capacity to perpetuate the human race and
the importance of raising children in that
preferred relationship.” Opponents of the
amendment argued that it “singles out one
specific group—people who are our
relatives, neighbors, and co-workers—to
deny them hundreds of rights and
protections that other Utahns enjoy.”
Amendment 3 passed with approximately
66% of the vote and became § 29 of Article
I of the Utah Constitution. This opinion will
refer to both of the foregoing statutes, along
with
the
constitutional
amendment,
collectively as “Amendment 3.”
Plaintiffs allege that Amendment 3 violates
their right to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment by depriving them
of the fundamental liberty to marry the
person of their choice and to have such a
marriage recognized. They also claim that
Amendment 3 violates the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Plaintiffs asserted their claims under 42
U.S.C. § 1983, seeking both a declaratory
judgment
that
Amendment
3
is
unconstitutional
and
an
injunction
prohibiting its enforcement.

On cross motions for summary judgment,
the district court ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs. It concluded that “[a]ll citizens,
regardless of their sexual identity, have a
fundamental right to liberty, and this right
protects an individual's ability to marry and
the intimate choices a person makes about
marriage and family.” The court further held
that Amendment 3 denied plaintiffs equal
protection because it classified based on sex
and sexual orientation without a rational
basis.
It
declared
Amendment
3
unconstitutional and permanently enjoined
enforcement of the challenged provisions.
Utah's Governor and Attorney General filed
a timely notice of appeal and moved to stay
the district court's decision. Both the district
court and this court denied a stay. The
Supreme Court, however, granted a stay of
the district court's injunction pending final
disposition of the appeal by this court.
II
We first consider the issue of standing,
although it was not raised by the parties. To
possess Article III standing, a plaintiff must
“establish (1) that he or she has suffered an
injury in fact; (2) that the injury is fairly
traceable to the challenged action of the
defendant; and[ ](3) that it is likely that the
injury will be redressed by a favorable
decision.”
Plaintiffs suing public officials can satisfy
the
causation
and
redressability
requirements of standing by demonstrating
“a meaningful nexus” between the defendant
and the asserted injury. “[T]he causation
element of standing requires the named
defendants to possess authority to enforce
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the complained-of provision,” and “[t]he
redressability prong is not met when a
plaintiff seeks relief against a defendant with
no power to enforce a challenged statute.”
“Whether the Defendants have enforcement
authority is related to whether, under Ex
parte Young, they are proper state officials
for suit.” Under Ex parte Young, a state
defendant sued in his official capacity must
“have
some
connection
with
the
enforcement” of a challenged provision. “An
officer need not have a special connection to
the allegedly unconstitutional statute; rather,
he need only have a particular duty to
enforce the statute in question and a
demonstrated willingness to exercise that
duty.”
We have no doubt that at least four of the
plaintiffs possessed standing to sue the Salt
Lake County Clerk based on their inability
to obtain marriage licenses from the Clerk's
office. Plaintiffs have identified several
harms that flow from this denial, including
financial injury. Because county clerks are
responsible under Utah law for issuing
marriage licenses and recording marriage
certificates, these plaintiffs' injuries were
caused by the Clerk's office and would be
cured by an injunction prohibiting the
enforcement of Amendment 3. Accordingly,
the Salt Lake County Clerk possessed the
requisite nexus to plaintiffs' injuries.
The Salt Lake County Clerk, however, has
not appealed from the district court's order.
We must therefore consider whether the
Governor and Attorney General are proper
appellants absent the County Clerk.
In Bishop v. Oklahoma ex rel. Edmondson,
we held that Oklahoma's Governor and

Attorney General were not proper
defendants in a challenge to that state's
prohibition on same-sex marriage. Because
of the legal and factual differences between
that case and this one, we reach the opposite
conclusion as to Utah's Governor and
Attorney General.
Our holding in Bishop turned on the
conclusion that marriage licensing and
recognition in Oklahoma were “within the
administration of the judiciary.” The district
court clerk charged with various duties
related to marriage “ ‘is judicial personnel
and is an arm of the court ... subject to the
control of the Supreme Court and the
supervisory control that it has passed down
to the Administrative District Judge in the
clerk's
administrative
district.’
”
Accordingly, we concluded that “the
executive branch of Oklahoma's government
has no authority to issue a marriage license
or record a marriage.”
In Utah, marriage licenses are issued not by
court clerks but by county clerks. The
Governor and Attorney General have
explicitly taken the position in this litigation
that they “have ample authority to ensure
that” the Salt Lake County Clerk “return[s]
to her former practice of limiting marriage
licenses to man-woman couples in
compliance with Utah law.” This assertion is
supported by the Utah Code. The Governor
is statutorily charged with “supervis[ing] the
official conduct of all executive and
ministerial officers” and “see[ing] that all
offices are filled and the duties thereof
performed.” In addition, he “may require the
attorney general to aid any county attorney
or district attorney in the discharge of his
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duties.” Utah law allows an action for the
removal of a county officer for “malfeasance
in office” to be brought by a “county
attorney, or district attorney for the county
in which the officer was elected or
appointed, or by the attorney general.”
The Attorney General is required to
“exercise supervisory powers over the
district and county attorneys of the state in
all matters pertaining to the duties of their
offices” and “when required by the public
service or directed by the governor, assist
any county, district, or city attorney in the
discharge of his duties.” A clerk who
“knowingly issues a license for any
prohibited marriage is guilty of a class A
misdemeanor.” Such charges would be filed
by a county or district attorney under the
supervision of the Attorney General. And
the Governor could order the Attorney
General to assist in such prosecution.
The Governor and Attorney General have
also demonstrated a “willingness to
exercise” their duty to ensure clerks and
other state officials enforce Amendment 3.
State agencies with responsibility for the
recognition of out-of-state marriages are
being directed by the Governor in
consultation
with
the
Attorney
General. These officials' authority over such
agencies is confirmed by Utah law. For
example, Plaintiffs Archer and Call, who
were married in Iowa, specifically seek to
file joint Utah tax returns. Although the
Utah State Tax Commission is charged in
the first instance with the duty “to
administer and supervise the tax laws of the
state,” the Attorney General in his
constitutional role as “the legal adviser of

the State officers,” is required by statute to
offer his “opinion in writing ... to any state
officer, board, or commission.” The
Attorney General considers his opinions to
the Utah State Tax Commission, even
informal ones, to be “authoritative for the
purposes” of the Commission “with respect
to the specific questions presented.” The
Attorney General is empowered to direct the
Tax Commission to recognize Archer and
Call's Iowa wedding, and the Commission
would be legally obligated to follow that
instruction and accept a joint tax return.
Accordingly, Archer and Call had standing
to sue the Attorney General for the injuries
caused by Amendment 3's nonrecognition
provisions.
The same is true with respect to the
Governor. Utah's “executive power” is
“vested in the Governor.” In the exercise of
that power, the Governor appoints the state's
tax commissioners and has the power to
initiate proceedings to remove them from
office. Shortly after the Governor sent the
above-quoted message to state agencies, the
Tax Commission issued a Tax Notice stating
that “[s]ame-sex couples who are eligible to
file a joint federal income tax return and
who elect to file jointly, may also file a joint
2013 Utah Individual Income Tax return.”
The Tax Notice refers to the district court's
injunction, noting that a stay of that order
had not been granted as of December 31,
2013. Thus, one of the injuries explicitly
cited by plaintiffs Archer and Call has been
at least temporarily redressed by the district
court's decision and actions taken in
response to it by the Governor after
consultation with the Attorney General.
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We conclude that the Governor's and the
Attorney General's actual exercise of
supervisory power and their authority to
compel compliance from county clerks and
other officials provide the requisite nexus
between them and Amendment 3. Although
“it does not suffice if the injury complained
of is the result of the independent action of
some third party not before the court, that
does not exclude injury produced by
determinative or coercive effect upon the
action of someone else.” And a state official
is a proper defendant if he is “responsible
for general supervision of the administration
by the local ... officials” of a challenged
provision. This is so even if the state
officials are “not specifically empowered to
ensure compliance with the statute at issue,”
if they “clearly have assisted or currently
assist in giving effect to the law.”
We thus conclude that standing issues do not
prevent us from considering this appeal.
III
In 1972, the Supreme Court summarily
“dismissed for want of substantial federal
question” an appeal from the Minnesota
Supreme Court upholding a ban on same-sex
marriage. The state court considered
“whether a marriage of two persons of the
same sex is authorized by state statutes and,
if not, whether state authorization is
constitutionally compelled.” It concluded
that the statute used the term “marriage” as
“one of common usage, meaning the state of
union between persons of the opposite
sex.” The state court further reasoned that
“[t]he institution of marriage as a union of
man and woman, uniquely involving the
procreation and rearing of children within a

family, is as old as the book of Genesis” and
that “[t]he due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is not a charter for
restructuring [the institution of marriage] by
judicial legislation.” As to the Equal
Protection Clause, the court ruled that
“[t]here is no irrational or invidious
discrimination” because “in commonsense
and in a constitutional sense, there is a clear
distinction between a marital restriction
based merely upon race and one based upon
the fundamental difference in sex.”
The Supreme Court has held that “summary
dismissals are, of course, to be taken as
rulings on the merits, in the sense that they
rejected the specific challenges presented in
the statement of jurisdiction and left
undisturbed the judgment appealed from.”
Summary dismissals
do not, however, have the same
precedential value here as does an
opinion of this Court after briefing and
oral argument on the merits. A
summary dismissal of an appeal
represents no more than a view that the
judgment appealed from was correct as
to those federal questions raised and
necessary to the decision. It does not, as
we have continued to stress, necessarily
reflect our agreement with the opinion
of the court whose judgment is
appealed.
“Summary affirmances and dismissals for
want of a substantial federal question
without doubt reject the specific challenges
presented in the statement of jurisdiction.”
And “[t]hey do prevent lower courts from
coming to opposite conclusions on the
precise issues presented and necessarily
decided by those actions.” “[I]f the Court
has branded a question as unsubstantial, it
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remains so except when doctrinal
developments indicate otherwise.” The
district court concluded that “doctrinal
developments” had superseded Baker. We
agree.
Two landmark decisions by the Supreme
Court have undermined the notion that the
question
presented
in Baker is
insubstantial. Baker was decided before the
Supreme Court held that “intimate conduct
with another person ... can be but one
element in a personal bond that is more
enduring. The liberty protected by the
Constitution allows homosexual persons the
right to make this choice.” The decision
in Baker also pre-dates the Court's opinion
in Windsor. Several courts held prior
to Windsor that Baker controlled the samesex
marriage
question.
However,
since Windsor was decided, nearly every
federal court to have considered the issue—
including the district court below—has ruled
that Baker does not control.
We acknowledge that the question presented
in Windsor is not identical to the question
before us. DOMA interfered with New
York's decision “that same-sex couples
should have the right to marry and so live
with pride in themselves and their union and
in a status of equality with all other married
persons,” a decision designed to “correct
what its citizens and elected representatives
perceived to be an injustice that they had not
earlier known or understood.” The “State
used its historic and essential authority to
define the marital relation in this way,” and
“its role and its power in making the
decision enhanced the recognition, dignity,
and protection of the class in their own

community.” Because DOMA used this
“state-defined class for the opposite
purpose—to impose restrictions and
disabilities,” the Court framed the
dispositive question as “whether the
resulting injury and indignity is a
deprivation of an essential part of the liberty
protected by the Fifth Amendment.”
Although it is true that Windsor resolved
tension between a state law permitting samesex marriage and a federal non-recognition
provision, the Court's description of the
issue indicates that its holding was not
solely based on the scope of federal versus
state powers.
Appellants stress the presence of these
federalism concerns in Windsor, which, as
the Chief Justice noted in dissent, “come
into play on the other side of the board in ...
cases about the constitutionality of state”
bans
on
same-sex
marriage.
The Windsor majority stated repeatedly that
the regulation of marriage has traditionally
been a state function. Appellants urge us to
conclude that the “principles of federalism
that Windsor would later reaffirm” require
us to adhere to the Court's summary
affirmance in Baker.
However, the Windsor Court also explained
that the federal government “in enacting
discrete statutes, can make determinations
that bear on marital rights and privileges.”
The Windsor Court concluded it was
“unnecessary to decide whether” DOMA “is
a violation of the Constitution because it
disrupts the federal balance.”
Rather than relying on federalism principles,
the Court framed the question presented as
whether the “injury and indignity” caused by
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DOMA “is a deprivation of an essential part
of the liberty protected by the Fifth
Amendment.” And the Court answered that
question in the affirmative:
The liberty protected by the Fifth
Amendment's Due Process Clause
contains within it the prohibition against
denying to any person the equal
protection of the laws. While the Fifth
Amendment itself withdraws from
Government the power to degrade or
demean in the way this law does, the
equal protection guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment makes that
Fifth Amendment right all the more
specific and all the better understood
and preserved.
“The history of DOMA's enactment and its
own
text,”
the
Court
concluded,
“demonstrate that interference with the
equal dignity of same-sex marriages, a
dignity conferred by the States in the
exercise of their sovereign power, was more
than an incidental effect of the federal
statute. It was its essence.” DOMA
“impose[d] a disadvantage, a separate status,
and so a stigma upon all who enter into
same-sex
marriages....”
The
statute
“undermine[d] both the public and private
significance of state-sanctioned same-sex
marriages” by telling “those couples, and all
the world, that their otherwise valid
marriages are unworthy of federal
recognition.” And it “humiliate[d] tens of
thousands of children now being raised by
same-sex couples” by making “it even more
difficult for the children to understand the
integrity and closeness of their own family
and its concord with other families in their
community and in their daily lives.”
Because DOMA's “differentiation demeans

[same-sex] couple[s], whose moral and
sexual choices the Constitution protects, and
whose relationship[s] the State has sought to
dignify,” the Court held that the statute
violated the Fifth Amendment.
The Windsor majority expressly cabined its
holding to state-recognized marriages, and is
thus not directly controlling. But the
similarity between the claims at issue in
Windsor and those asserted by the plaintiffs
in this case cannot be ignored. This is
particularly true with respect to plaintiffs
Archer and Call, who seek recognition by
Utah of a marriage that is valid in the state
where it was performed. More generally, all
six plaintiffs seek equal dignity for their
marital aspirations. All claim that the state's
differential treatment of them as compared
to opposite-sex couples demeans and
undermines their relationships and their
personal autonomy. Although reasonable
judges may disagree on the merits of the
same-sex marriage question, we think it is
clear that doctrinal developments foreclose
the conclusion that the issue is,
as Baker determined, wholly insubstantial.
IV
We turn now to the merits of the issue
before us. We must first decide whether the
liberty interest protected in this case
includes the right to marry, and whether that
right is limited, as appellants contend, to
those who would wed a person of the
opposite sex.
The district court granted summary
judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. We
review a grant of summary judgment de
novo. A party is entitled to summary
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judgment only if, viewing the evidence in
the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.
“We review the decision to grant a
permanent injunction for abuse of
discretion.” To obtain a permanent
injunction, a plaintiff must show: “(1) actual
success on the merits; (2) irreparable harm
unless the injunction is issued; (3) the
threatened injury outweighs the harm that
the injunction may cause the opposing party;
and (4) the injunction, if issued, will not
adversely affect the public interest.”
Because appellants have challenged only the
merits aspect of the district court's decision,
we do not consider the remaining factors.
A
“[A]ll fundamental rights comprised within
the term liberty are protected by the Federal
Constitution from invasion by the States.”
The doctrine of substantive due process
extends protections to fundamental rights
“in addition to the specific freedoms
protected by the Bill of Rights.” To qualify
as “fundamental,” a right must be
“objectively, deeply rooted in this Nation's
history and tradition ... and implicit in the
concept of ordered liberty, such that neither
liberty nor justice would exist if [it] were
sacrificed.”
1
There can be little doubt that the right to
marry is a fundamental liberty.
The Court has long recognized that marriage
is “the most important relation in life.”
“Without doubt,” the liberty protected by the

Fourteenth Amendment includes the
freedom “to marry, establish a home[,] and
bring up children.”
Appellants contend that these precedents
and others establish only that opposite-sex
marriage is a fundamental right. They
highlight the Court's admonition to
undertake a “careful description of the
asserted fundamental liberty interest.” “This
approach tends to rein in the subjective
elements that are necessarily present in dueprocess judicial review.” A right to samesex marriage cannot be deeply rooted in our
tradition, appellants argue, because “until
recent years, many citizens had not even
considered the possibility that two persons
of the same sex might aspire to occupy the
same status and dignity as that of a man and
woman in lawful marriage.”
But “the right to marry is of fundamental
importance for all individuals.” In numerous
cases, the Court has discussed the right to
marry at a broader level of generality than
would be consistent with appellants'
argument. The Loving Court concluded that
a state statute voiding marriages between
white and non-white participants violated
the Due Process Clause.
As the Court later explained, “[m]arriage is
mentioned nowhere in the Bill of Rights and
interracial marriage was illegal in most
States in the 19th century, but the Court was
no doubt correct in finding it to be an aspect
of liberty protected against state interference
by the substantive component of the Due
Process Clause in Loving v. Virginia.” Thus
the question as stated in Loving, and as
characterized in subsequent opinions, was
not whether there is a deeply rooted tradition
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of interracial marriage, or whether
interracial marriage is implicit in the concept
of ordered liberty; the right at issue was “the
freedom of choice to marry.”
Similarly, Zablocki considered an equal
protection challenge to a state law barring
individuals in arrearage of child support
obligations from marrying. Because “the
right to marry is of fundamental importance”
and “the classification at issue ...
significantly interfere[d] with the exercise of
that right,” the Court determined that
“critical examination of the state interests
advanced in support of the classification
[wa]s required.” It cautioned that not “every
state regulation which relates in any way to
the incidents of or prerequisites for marriage
must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny. To
the contrary, reasonable regulations that do
not significantly interfere with decisions to
enter into the marital relationship may
legitimately be imposed.” But the statute at
issue was impermissible because it
constituted a “serious intrusion into [the]
freedom of choice in an area in which we
have held such freedom to be fundamental”
and could not “be upheld unless it [wa]s
supported by sufficiently important state
interests and [wa]s closely tailored to
effectuate only those interests.” The right at
issue was characterized as the right to marry,
not as the right of child-support debtors to
marry.
2
It
is
true
that
both Loving and Zablocki involved oppositesex couples. Such pairings, appellants
remind us, may be naturally procreative—a
potentially meaningful consideration given

that the Court has previously discussed
marriage and procreation together.
But the Court has also described the
fundamental right to marry as separate from
the
right
to
procreate,
including
in Glucksberg itself, the case upon which
appellants' fundamental-right argument
turns. Appellants' contention that the right to
marriage is fundamental because of its
procreative potential is also undercut
by Turner v. Safley.
As the Turner opinion highlights, the
importance of marriage is based in great
measure on “personal aspects” including the
“expression[ ] of emotional support and
public commitment.” This conclusion is
consistent
with
the
Court's
other
pronouncements on the freedom to marry,
which focus on the freedom to choose one's
spouse. The Turner Court also highlighted
the role of marriage in allowing its
participants to gain access to legal and
financial benefits they would otherwise
be denied.
We must reject appellants' efforts to
downplay the importance of the personal
elements inherent in the institution of
marriage, which they contend are “not the
principal interests the State pursues by
regulating marriage.” Rather than being
“[m]utually exclusive” of the procreative
potential of marriage, these freedoms—to
choose one's spouse, to decide whether to
conceive or adopt a child, to publicly
proclaim an enduring commitment to remain
together through thick and thin—reinforce
the childrearing family structure. Further,
such freedoms support the dignity of each
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person, a factor
Windsor Court.

emphasized

by

the

Of course, the Windsor decision dealt with
federal recognition of marriages performed
under state law. But with respect to plaintiffs
Archer and Call, who were married in Iowa
and whose marriage Utah will not recognize
under Amendment 3, the analogy
to Windsor is particularly apt. Amendment
3's non-recognition provision, like DOMA,
contrives to deprive some couples
married under the laws of [another]
State, but not other couples, of both
rights and responsibilities.... By this
dynamic [Amendment 3] undermines
both the public and private significance
of state-sanctioned same-sex marriages;
for it tells those couples, and all the
world, that their otherwise valid
marriages are unworthy of [Utah's]
recognition....
The
differentiation
demeans the couple, whose moral and
sexual choices the Constitution protects.
In light of Windsor, we agree with the
multiple district courts that have held that
the fundamental right to marry necessarily
includes the right to remain married.
And although we acknowledge that state
recognition serves to “enhance[ ]” the
interests at stake, surely a great deal of the
dignity of same-sex relationships inheres in
the loving bonds between those who seek to
marry and the personal autonomy of making
such choices. As the Court held
in Lawrence, several years before discussing
the state recognition issues present
in Windsor,
adults may choose to enter upon [an
intimate] relationship in the confines of
their homes and their own private lives

and still retain their dignity as free
persons. When sexuality finds overt
expression in intimate conduct with
another person, the conduct can be but
one element in a personal bond that is
more enduring. The liberty protected by
the Constitution allows homosexual
persons the right to make this choice.
Appellants' assertion that the right to marry
is fundamental because it is linked to
procreation is further undermined by the fact
that individuals have a fundamental right to
choose against reproduction. “If the right of
privacy means anything, it is the right of the
individual, married or single, to be free from
unwarranted governmental intrusion into
matters so fundamentally affecting a person
as the decision whether to bear or beget a
child.”
The Court has repeatedly referenced the
raising of children—rather than just their
creation—as a key factor in the inviolability
of marital and familial choices. Although
cohabitating
same-sex
couples
are
prohibited from jointly adopting children
under Utah law as a result of the same-sex
marriage ban, the record shows that nearly
3,000 Utah children are being raised by
same-sex couples. Thus childrearing, a
liberty closely related to the right to marry,
is one exercised by same-sex and oppositesex couples alike, as well as by single
individuals.
Appellants urge us to conclude that a court
cannot determine whether there is a right to
marriage without first defining the
institution. They also say that the term
“marriage” by its nature excludes same-sex
couples. Glucksberg requires us to develop a
“careful description of the asserted
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fundamental liberty interest,” relying on
“[o]ur Nation's history, legal traditions, and
practices [to] provide the crucial guideposts
for responsible decisionmaking.” But we
cannot conclude that the fundamental liberty
interest in this case is limited to the right to
marry a person of the opposite sex. As we
have discussed, the Supreme Court has
traditionally described the right to marry in
broad terms independent of the persons
exercising it. The Court's other substantive
due process cases similarly eschew a
discussion of the right-holder in defining the
scope of the right. In Glucksberg, for
example, the Court framed the question
presented as “whether the ‘liberty’ specially
protected in the Due Process Clause includes
a right to commit suicide which itself
includes a right to assistance in doing so.”
The Court's formulation implicitly rejected
respondents' framing of the claimed liberty
as exercised by a specific class of persons:
“Whether the Fourteenth Amendment's
guarantee of liberty protects the decision of
a mentally competent, terminally ill adult to
bring about impending death in a certain,
humane, and dignified manner.”
Prior to the Windsor decision, several courts
concluded that the well-established right to
marry eo ipso cannot be exercised by those
who would choose a spouse of the same sex.
We nonetheless agree with plaintiffs that in
describing the liberty interest at stake, it is
impermissible to focus on the identity or
class-membership
of
the
individual
exercising the right. “Simply put,
fundamental rights are fundamental rights.
They are not defined in terms of who is
entitled to exercise them.” Plaintiffs seek to
enter into legally recognized marriages, with

all
the
concomitant
rights
and
responsibilities enshrined in Utah law. They
desire not to redefine the institution but to
participate in it.
Appellants' assertion that plaintiffs are
excluded from the institution of marriage by
definition is wholly circular. Nothing
logically or physically precludes same-sex
couples from marrying, as is amply
demonstrated by the fact that many states
now permit such marriages. Appellants'
reliance on the modifier “definitional” does
not serve a meaningful function in this
context. To claim that marriage, by
definition, excludes certain couples is
simply to insist that those couples may not
marry because they have historically been
denied the right to do so. One might just as
easily have argued that interracial couples
are by definition excluded from the
institution of marriage. But “neither history
nor tradition could save a law prohibiting
miscegenation from constitutional attack.”
Our conclusion that we are not required to
defer to Utah's characterization of its ban on
same-sex marriage as a “definition” is
reinforced by the Court's opinion
in Windsor. Section 3 of DOMA, which the
Court invalidated, “amend [ed] the
Dictionary Act ... of the United States Code
to provide a federal definition of ‘marriage’
and ‘spouse.’ ” In relevant part, the statute
read: “ ‘[T]he word ‘marriage’ means only a
legal union between one man and one
woman as husband and wife, and the word
‘spouse’ refers only to a person of the
opposite sex who is a husband or a wife.' ”
Appellants
repeatedly
assert
that
Amendment 3 simply defines marriage, at
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one point contrasting “the traditional
definition of marriage” with “the antimiscegenation laws invalidated in Loving.”
They contend that “Utah's marriage laws
merely define marriage within its borders.”
The
Court's
holding
in Windsor demonstrates that a provision
labeled a “definition” is not immune from
constitutional scrutiny. We see no reason to
allow Utah's invocation of its power to
“define the marital relation,” to become “a
talisman, by whose magic power the whole
fabric which the law had erected ... is at
once dissolved.”
Although courts may be tempted “to
suppose that the Due Process Clause
protects only those practices, defined at the
most specific level, that were protected
against government interference by other
rules of law when the Fourteenth
Amendment was ratified.... such a view
would be inconsistent with our law.” “A
prime part of the history of our Constitution
... is the story of the extension of
constitutional rights and protections to
people once ignored or excluded.”
3
The Supreme Court's sexual orientation
jurisprudence further precludes us from
defining the fundamental right at issue in the
manner sought by the appellants.
In Lawrence, the Court struck down as
violative of due process a statute that
prohibited
sexual
conduct
between
individuals of the same sex. The Court
reversed Bowers v. Hardwick, which in
upholding a similar statute had framed the
question as “whether the Federal
Constitution confers a fundamental right

upon homosexuals to engage in sodomy and
hence invalidates the laws of the many
States that still make such conduct illegal
and have done so for a very long time.”
The Lawrence Court held that this framing
“fail[ed] to appreciate the extent of the
liberty at stake” and “misapprehended the
claim of liberty there presented to it.”
The Court acknowledged that “for centuries
there have been powerful voices to condemn
homosexual conduct as immoral,” but held
that its obligation was “to define the liberty
of all, not to mandate our own moral code.”
“[B]efore 1961 all 50 States had outlawed
sodomy,” yet “[h]istory and tradition are the
starting point but not in all cases the ending
point of the substantive due process
inquiry.” The Court firmly rejected Bowers'
characterization of the liberty at issue: “To
say that the issue in Bowers was simply the
right to engage in certain sexual conduct
demeans the claim the individual put
forward, just as it would demean a married
couple were it to be said marriage is simply
about the right to have sexual intercourse.”
The Court's rejection of the manner in
which Bowers described the liberty interest
involved is applicable to the framing of the
issue before us. There was clearly no history
of a protected right to “homosexual
sodomy,” just as there is no lengthy tradition
of
same-sex
marriage.
But
the Lawrence opinion indicates that the
approach urged by appellants is too narrow.
Just as it was improper to ask whether there
is a right to engage in homosexual sex, we
do not ask whether there is a right to
participate in same-sex marriage.
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We must also note that Lawrence itself
alluded to marriage, stating that “our laws
and tradition afford constitutional protection
to personal decisions relating to marriage,
procreation,
contraception,
family
relationships, child rearing, and education.”
The Court quoted Casey's holding that
matters “involving the most intimate and
personal choices a person may make in a
lifetime, choices central to personal dignity
and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment”
and ruled that “[p]ersons in a homosexual
relationship may seek autonomy for these
purposes, just as heterosexual persons do.”
The drafters of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments “knew times can blind us to
certain truths and later generations can see
that laws once thought necessary and proper
in fact serve only to oppress. As the
Constitution endures, persons in every
generation can invoke its principles in their
own search for greater freedom.” A
generation ago, recognition of the
fundamental right to marry as applying to
persons of the same sex might have been
unimaginable. A generation ago, the
declaration by gay and lesbian couples of
what may have been in their hearts would
have had to remain unspoken. Not until
contemporary times have laws stigmatizing
or even criminalizing gay men and women
been felled, allowing their relationships to
surface to an open society. As the district
court eloquently explained, “it is not the
Constitution that has changed, but the
knowledge of what it means to be gay or
lesbian.” Consistent with our constitutional
tradition of recognizing the liberty of those
previously excluded, we conclude that

plaintiffs possess a fundamental right to
marry and to have their marriages
recognized.
B
The Due Process Clause “forbids the
government to infringe certain fundamental
liberty interests at all, no matter what
process is provided, unless the infringement
is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest.” By the same token, if a
classification “impinge[s] upon the exercise
of a fundamental right,” the Equal
Protection Clause requires “the State to
demonstrate that its classification has been
precisely tailored to serve a compelling
governmental interest.” Having persuaded
us that the right to marry is a fundamental
liberty, plaintiffs will prevail on their due
process and equal protection claims unless
appellants can show that Amendment 3
survives strict scrutiny.
A provision subject to strict scrutiny “cannot
rest upon a generalized assertion as to the
classification's relevance to its goals.” “The
purpose of the narrow tailoring requirement
is to ensure that the means chosen fit the
compelling goal so closely that there is little
or no possibility that the motive for the
classification was illegitimate.” Only “the
most exact connection between justification
and classification” survives.
Appellants advance four justifications for
Amendment 3. They contend it furthers the
state's interests in: (1) “fostering a childcentric marriage culture that encourages
parents to subordinate their own interests to
the needs of their children”; (2) “children
being raised by their biological mothers and
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fathers—or at least by a married mother and
father—in a stable home”; (3) “ensuring
adequate
reproduction”;
and
(4)
“accommodating religious freedom and
reducing the potential for civic strife.”
1
We will assume that the first three rationales
asserted by appellants are compelling. These
justifications falter, however, on the means
prong of the strict scrutiny test. Each rests
on a link between marriage and procreation.
Appellants contend that Utah has
“steadfastly sought to reserve unique social
recognition for man-woman marriage so as
to guide as many procreative couples as
possible into the optimal, conjugal
childrearing model”; that “children suffer
when procreation and childrearing occur
outside stable man-woman marriages”; and
that “[b]y providing special privileges and
status to couples that are uniquely capable of
producing offspring without biological
assistance from third parties, the State sends
a clear if subtle message to all of its citizens
that natural reproduction is healthy,
desirable and highly valued.” The common
thread running through each of appellants'
first three arguments is the claim that
allowing same-sex couples to marry “would
break the critical conceptual link between
marriage and procreation.”
The challenged restrictions on the right to
marry and on recognition of otherwise valid
marriages, however, do not differentiate
between procreative and non-procreative
couples. Instead, Utah citizens may choose a
spouse of the opposite sex regardless of the
pairing's procreative capacity. The elderly,
those medically unable to conceive, and

those who exercise their fundamental right
not to have biological children are free to
marry and have their out-of-state marriages
recognized in Utah, apparently without
breaking the “conceptual link between
marriage and procreation.” The only explicit
reference to reproduction in Utah's marriage
law is a provision that allows first cousins to
marry if “both parties are 65 years of age or
older; or ... if both parties are 55 years of
age or older, upon a finding by the district
court ... that either party is unable to
reproduce.” This statute thus extends
marriage rights to certain couples based on a
showing of inability to reproduce.
Such a mismatch between the class
identified by a challenged law and the
characteristic allegedly relevant to the state's
interest is precisely the type of imprecision
prohibited by heightened scrutiny. Utah's
ban on polygamy, for example, is justified
by arguments against polygamy. Similarly,
barring minors from marriage may be
justified based on arguments specific to
minors as a class. But appellants fail to
advance any argument against same-sex
marriage that is based specifically on its
alleged intrinsic ills.
Instead of explaining why same-sex
marriage qua same-sex marriage is
undesirable, each of the appellants'
justifications rests fundamentally on a
sleight of hand in which same-sex marriage
is used as a proxy for a different
characteristic shared by both same-sex and
some opposite-sex couples. Same-sex
marriage must be banned, appellants argue,
because same-sex couples are not naturally
procreative. But the state permits many
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other types of non-procreative couples to
wed. Same-sex marriage cannot be allowed,
appellants assert, because it is better for
children to be raised by biological parents.
Yet adoptive parents, who have the full
panoply of rights and duties of biological
parents, are free to marry. As are oppositesex
couples who choose assisted
reproduction.
The Supreme Court has similarly eschewed
such means-ends mismatches. For example,
in Bernal v. Fainter, the Court concluded
that a Texas statute prohibiting resident
aliens from becoming notaries failed strict
scrutiny. The state argued that the provision
was justified by the state's interest in
licensing notaries familiar with state law.
But the Court rejected the state's attempt to
justify a classification based on alienage
with an explanation based on knowledge.
Just as a state cannot justify an alienage
classification by reference to a separate
characteristic such as familiarity with state
law, appellants cannot assert procreative
potential as a basis to deny marriage rights
to same-sex couples. Under strict scrutiny,
the state must justify the specific means it
has chosen rather than relying on some other
characteristic that correlates loosely with the
actual restriction at issue.
Utah law sanctions many marriages that
share the characteristic—inability to
procreate—ostensibly
targeted
by
Amendment 3. The absence of narrow
tailoring is often revealed by such underinclusiveness.
In Zablocki, the
state
attempted to defend its prohibition on
marriage by child-support debtors on the
ground that the statute “prevent[ed] the

applicants from incurring new support
obligations.” “But
the
challenged
provisions,” the Court explained, “are
grossly underinclusive with respect to this
purpose, since they do not limit in any way
new financial commitments by the applicant
other than those arising out of the
contemplated marriage.” Similarly, in
Eisenstadt, the Court rejected the argument
that unmarried individuals might be
prohibited from using contraceptives based
on the view that contraception is
immoral. The Court held that “the State
could not, consistently with the Equal
Protection Clause, outlaw distribution to
unmarried but not to married persons. In
each case the evil, as perceived by the State,
would be identical, and the underinclusion
would be invidious.”
A state may not impinge upon the exercise
of a fundamental right as to some, but not
all, of the individuals who share a
characteristic urged to be relevant.
A hypothetical state law restricting the
institution of marriage to only those who are
able and willing to procreate would plainly
raise its own constitutional concerns. That
question is not before us, and we do not
address it. We merely observe that a state
may not satisfy the narrow tailoring
requirement by pointing to a trait shared by
those on both sides of a challenged
classification.
Among the myriad types of non-procreative
couples, only those Utahns who seek to
marry a partner of the same sex are
categorically excluded from the institution
of marriage. Only same-sex couples,
appellants claim, need to be excluded to
558

further the state's interest in communicating
the link between unassisted biological
procreation and marriage. As between nonprocreative opposite-sex couples and samesex couples, we can discern no meaningful
distinction with respect to appellants'
interest in fostering biological reproduction
within marriages.
The Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a
direction that all persons similarly situated
should be treated alike.” Extending the
benefits and protections of a civil society to
some but not all similarly situated families
violates this critical guarantee.
2
Appellants argue that procreative couples
must be channeled into committed
relationships in order to promote the State's
interests in childbearing and optimal
childrearing. This argument fails because the
prohibition on same-sex marriage has an
insufficient causal connection to the State's
articulated goals.
It is urged upon us that permitting same-sex
couples to marry would have far-reaching
and drastic consequences for Utah's
opposite-sex couples. Appellants contend
that the recognition of same-sex marriage
would result in a parade of horribles,
causing: “parents to raise their existing
biological children without the other
biological parent”; “couples conceiving
children without the stability that marriage
would otherwise bring”; “a substantial
decline in the public's interest in marriage”;
“adults to [forgo] or severely limit the
number of their children based on concerns
for their own convenience”; and “a busy or

irresponsible parent to believe it's
appropriate to sacrifice his child's welfare to
his own needs for independence, free time,
etc.”
In some instances, courts “must accord
substantial deference to the predictive
judgments” of legislative authorities.
“Sound policymaking often requires
legislators to forecast future events and to
anticipate the likely impact of these events
based on deductions and inferences for
which complete empirical support may be
unavailable.” But even under more relaxed
forms of scrutiny, a challenged classification
“must find some footing in the realities of
the subject addressed by the legislation”
based on a “reasonably conceivable state of
facts.”
We emphatically agree with the numerous
cases decided since Windsor that it is wholly
illogical to believe that state recognition of
the love and commitment between same-sex
couples will alter the most intimate and
personal decisions of opposite-sex couples.
As the district court held, “[t]here is no
reason to believe that Amendment 3 has any
effect on the choices of couples to have or
raise children, whether they are opposite-sex
couples or same-sex couples.” This was the
first of several federal court decisions
reaching the same conclusion.
A state's interest in developing and
sustaining committed relationships between
childbearing couples is simply not
connected to its recognition of same-sex
marriages. Regardless of whether some
individuals are denied the right to choose
their spouse, the same set of duties,
responsibilities, and benefits set forth under
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Utah law apply to those naturally
procreative pairings touted by appellants.
We cannot imagine a scenario under which
recognizing same-sex marriages would
affect the decision of a member of an
opposite-sex couple to have a child, to marry
or stay married to a partner, or to make
personal sacrifices for a child. We agree
with the district court that such decisions,
among “the most intimate and personal ... a
person may make in a lifetime, choices
central to personal dignity and autonomy,”
are unrelated to the government's treatment
of same-sex marriage. To the extent that
they are related, the relation exists because
the State of Utah has chosen to burden the
ability of one class of citizens to make such
intimate and personal choices.
3
Appellants also argue that Utah's ban on
same-sex marriage is justified by gendered
parenting preferences. They contend that
even for families that are not biologically
connected, the state has an interest in
limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples
because “men and women parent children
differently.”
But a prohibition on same-sex marriage is
not narrowly tailored toward the goal of
encouraging gendered parenting styles. The
state does not restrict the right to marry or
its recognition of marriage based on
compliance with any set of parenting roles,
or even parenting quality. Instead, every
same-sex couple, regardless of parenting
style, is barred from marriage and every
opposite-sex
couple,
irrespective
of
parenting style, is permitted to marry.

The state's child custody regime also belies
adherence to a rigidly gendered view of
parents' abilities. As with appellants'
asserted procreation rationale, we are
offered no coherent explanation for the
state's decision to impose disabilities upon
only one subclass of those sharing a claimed
deficiency.
The Supreme Court has previously rejected
state attempts to classify parents with such a
broad brush. In Stanley v. Illinois, the Court
considered the validity of a state law that
made children of unwed parents wards of
the state upon death of the mother. The state
defended this provision by asserting that
“unmarried fathers can reasonably be
presumed to be unqualified to raise their
children.” “But all unmarried fathers are not
in this category; some are wholly suited to
have custody of their children.” Just as the
state law at issue in Stanley “needlessly
risk[ed] running roughshod over the
important interests of both parent and child,”
Amendment 3 cannot be justified by the
impermissibly overbroad assumption that
any opposite-sex couple is preferable to any
same-sex couple.
Appellants have retreated from any
categorical conclusions regarding the quality
of same-sex parenting. Although they
presented to the district court voluminous
scholarship addressing various parenting
issues, they now take the position that the
social science is unsettled. At oral argument,
counsel for appellants stated that “the
bottom line” regarding the consequences of
same-sex parenting “is that the science is
inconclusive.”
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Although we assume that the State's asserted
interest in biological parenting is
compelling, this assumption does not require
us to accept appellants' related arguments on
faith. We cannot embrace the contention that
children raised by opposite-sex parents fare
better than children raised by same-sex
parents—to the extent appellants continue to
press it—in light of their representations to
this court. Appellants' only reasoning in this
regard is that there might be advantages in
one parenting arrangement that are lacking
in the other. On strict scrutiny, an argument
based only on pure speculation and
conjecture cannot carry the day. Appellants'
tepid defense of their parenting theory
further highlights the looseness of the fit
between the State's chosen means and
appellants' asserted end.
Against the State's claim of uncertainty we
must weigh the harm Amendment 3
currently works against the children of
same-sex couples. If appellants cannot tell
us with any degree of confidence that they
believe opposite-sex parenting produces
better outcomes on the whole—and they
evidently cannot—they fail to justify this
palpable harm that the Supreme Court has
unequivocally
condemned.
The Windsor majority, stressing the same
detrimental impacts of DOMA, explained
that the refusal to recognize same-sex
marriages brings “financial harm to children
of same-sex couples” and makes “it even
more difficult for the children [of same-sex
couples] to understand the integrity and
closeness of their own family and its
concord with other families in their
community and in their daily lives.”

Windsor thus indicates that same-sex
marriage restrictions communicate to
children the message that same-sex parents
are less deserving of family recognition than
other parents. Appellants rely heavily on
their predictions that Amendment 3 will
encourage adults to make various decisions
that benefit society. But regardless of the
signals the law sends to adults, Amendment
3, like DOMA, conveys a harmful message
to the children of same-sex couples. These
collateral consequences further suggest that
the fit between the means and the end is
insufficient to survive strict scrutiny.
4
Appellants' fourth and final justification for
Amendment 3, “accommodating religious
freedom and reducing the potential for civic
strife,” fails for reasons independent of the
foregoing. Appellants contend that a
prohibition on same-sex marriage “is
essential to preserving social harmony in the
State” and that allowing same-sex couples to
marry “would create the potential for
religion-related strife.”
Even assuming that appellants are correct in
predicting that some substantial degree of
discord will follow state recognition of
same-sex marriage, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly held that public opposition
cannot provide cover for a violation of
fundamental rights. In Watson v. City of
Memphis, for example, the Court rejected a
city's claim that “community confusion and
turmoil” permitted it to delay desegregation
of its public parks. And in Cleburne, the
Court held that negative attitudes toward the
class at issue (intellectually impaired
individuals) “are not permissible bases for
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treating a home for the mentally retarded
differently.” “It is plain that the electorate as
a whole, whether by referendum or
otherwise, could not order city action
violative of the Equal Protection Clause, and
the city may not avoid the strictures of that
Clause by deferring to the wishes or
objections of some fraction of the body
politic.”
Appellants acknowledge that a state may not
“invoke concerns about religious freedom or
religion-related social strife as a basis for
denying rights otherwise guaranteed by the
Constitution.” But they argue that the social
and religious strife argument qualifies as
legitimate because a fundamental right is not
at issue in this case. Because we have
rejected appellants' contention on this point,
their fourth justification necessarily fails.
We also emphasize, as did the district court,
that today's decision relates solely to civil
marriage. Plaintiffs must be accorded the
same legal status presently granted to
married couples, but religious institutions
remain as free as they always have been to
practice their sacraments and traditions as
they see fit. We respect the views advanced
by members
of
various
religious
communities and their discussions of the
theological history of marriage. And we
continue to recognize the right of the various
religions to define marriage according to
their moral, historical, and ethical precepts.
Our opinion does not intrude into that
domain or the exercise of religious
principles in this arena. The right of an
officiant to perform or decline to perform a
religious ceremony is unaffected by today's
ruling.

C
Appellants raise a number of prudential
concerns in addition to the four legal
justifications discussed above. They stress
the value of democratic decision-making
and the benefits of federalism in allowing
states to serve as laboratories for the rules
concerning marriage. As a matter of policy,
it might well be preferable to allow the
national debate on same-sex marriage to
play out through legislative and democratic
channels. Some will no doubt view today's
decision as “robbing the winners of an
honest victory, and the losers of the peace
that comes from a fair defeat.”
But the judiciary is not empowered to pick
and choose the timing of its decisions. “It is
a judge's duty to decide all cases within his
jurisdiction that are brought before him,
including controversial cases that arouse the
most intense feelings in the litigants.”
Plaintiffs in this case have convinced us that
Amendment 3 violates their fundamental
right to marry and to have their marriages
recognized. We may not deny them relief
based on a mere preference that their
arguments be settled elsewhere. Nor may we
defer to majority will in dealing with matters
so central to personal autonomy. The
protection and exercise of fundamental
rights are not matters for opinion polls or the
ballot box. “One's right to life, liberty, and
property, to free speech, a free press,
freedom of worship and assembly, and other
fundamental rights may not be submitted to
vote; they depend on the outcome of no
elections.”
Similarly, the experimental value of
federalism cannot overcome plaintiffs' rights
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to due process and equal protection. Despite
Windsor's emphasis on state authority over
marriage, the Court repeatedly tempered its
pronouncements with the caveat that “[s]tate
laws defining and regulating marriage, of
course, must respect the constitutional rights
of persons.” Our federalist structure is
designed to “secure[ ] to citizens the
liberties that derive from the diffusion of
sovereign power” rather than to limit
fundamental freedoms.
Appellants also suggest that today's ruling
will place courts on a slippery slope towards
recognizing other forms of currently
prohibited marriages. Although we have no
occasion to weigh in on the validity of laws
not challenged in this case, same-sex
marriage prohibitions differ in at least one
key respect from the types of marriages the
appellants identify: Unlike polygamous or
incestuous marriages, the Supreme Court
has explicitly extended constitutional
protection
to
intimate
same-sex
relationships,
and
to
the
public
manifestations of those relationships. Our
holding that plaintiffs seek to exercise a
fundamental right turns in large measure on
this jurisprudential foundation that does not
exist as to the hypothetical challenges
identified by appellants.
V
In summary, we hold that under the Due
Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the
United States Constitution, those who wish
to marry a person of the same sex are
entitled to exercise the same fundamental
right as is recognized for persons who wish
to marry a person of the opposite sex, and
that Amendment 3 and similar statutory

enactments do not withstand constitutional
scrutiny. We AFFIRM the judgment of the
district court.
In consideration of the Supreme Court's
decision to stay the district court's injunction
pending the appeal to our circuit, we
conclude it is appropriate to STAY our
mandate pending the disposition of any
subsequently filed petition for writ of
certiorari.
It is so ordered.
KELLY, Circuit Judge, concurring in part
and dissenting in part.
I concur with the court's result that Plaintiffs
have standing to challenge the provisions at
issue, that the Salt Lake County Clerk,
Governor, and Attorney General were
proper Defendants, and that the appeal may
proceed despite the absence of the Salt Lake
County Clerk. I disagree with this court's
conclusions that (1) Baker v. Nelson need
not be followed and that (2) the liberty
guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment
includes a fundamental right which requires
Utah to extend marriage to same-gender
couples and
recognize same-gender
marriages from other states. Because I
conclude that there is no such fundamental
right, it is unnecessary to consider whether
Utah's justifications for retaining its
repeatedly-enacted concept of marriage pass
heightened scrutiny. In my view, the
provisions should be analyzed under
traditional equal protection analysis and
upheld as rationally related to (1)
responsible procreation, (2) effective
parenting, and (3) the desire to proceed
cautiously in this evolving area.
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For the following reasons, I respectfully
dissent.
A. Baker v. Nelson
The petitioners in Baker argued that
Minnesota's marriage scheme violated due
process and equal protection. The Minnesota
Supreme Court unambiguously rejected the
notion that same-gender marriage was a
fundamental right, interpreting Loving v.
Virginia as resting upon the Constitution's
prohibition of race discrimination. Absent
irrational or invidious discrimination, a
“theoretically
imperfect”
marriage
classification does not offend equal
protection or due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment. The import
of Baker to this case is clear: neither due
process nor equal protection bar states from
defining marriage as between one man and
one woman, or require states to extend
marriage to same-gender couples.
A summary dismissal is a merits
determination and a lower federal court
should not come to an opposite conclusion
on the issues presented. The district court
relied upon a statement in Hicks v.
Miranda that
a
question
remains
unsubstantial
unless
“doctrinal
developments” may suggest otherwise. On
this point, Miranda held that a summary
dismissal could not be disregarded. Were
there
any
doubt,
the
“doctrinal
developments” exception was followed by a
statement that summary decisions are
binding on lower courts until the Court
notifies otherwise.
The rule is clear: if a Supreme Court case is
directly on point, a lower federal court

should rely on it so the Supreme Court may
exercise “the prerogative of overruling its
own decisions.” The Supreme Court is
certainly free to re-examine its precedents,
but it discourages lower courts from
concluding it has overruled earlier precedent
by implication. The majority construes the
unequivocal statement in Rodriguez de
Quijas (and presumably Agostini ) as
inapplicable because it appeared in a merits
disposition and accordingly did not
“overrule” the “doctrinal developments rule”
as to summary dispositions. But that is just
another way of stating that a summary
disposition is not a merits disposition, which
is patently incorrect. Though the Supreme
Court may not accord Baker the same
deference as an opinion after briefing and
argument, it is nonetheless precedential for
this court. Summary dismissals are merits
rulings as to those questions raised in the
jurisdictional statement.
Plaintiffs argue that Baker did not address
the precise issues here because “[t]he
judgment
affirmed
in Baker addressed
whether same-sex couples were denied
equal protection and due process by
Minnesota's marriage statute—a measure
that did not indicate on its face whether
same-sex couples could marry and that had
not been enacted for the express purpose of
excluding same-sex couples from marriage.”
They further argue that Utah's nonrecognition of Plaintiffs Archer and Call's
Iowa marriage distinguishes this case
from Baker. Neither reason is persuasive.
The fact remains that the Minnesota
Supreme Court interpreted the state statute
(at the time) to not require same-gender
marriage and decided largely the same
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federal constitutional questions presented
here. To the extent there is no right to samegender marriage emanating from the
Fourteenth Amendment, a state should not
be compelled to recognize it.
Regardless,
subsequent
doctrinal
developments have not undermined the
Court's traditional deference to the States in
the field of domestic relations. To be sure,
the district court concluded otherwise based
upon the following Supreme Court
developments: (1) gender becoming a quasisuspect class, (2) invalidation of a state law
repealing and barring sexual-orientation
protection, (3) invalidation of a statute that
proscribed same-gender sexual relations
insofar as private conduct among consenting
adults, (4) declaring the Defense of
Marriage Act's (“DOMA”) definition of
“marriage” and “spouse” to exclude samegender marriages as violative of Fifth
Amendment due process and equal
protection principles. This court relies on
Lawrence and Windsor as justification for
not deferring to Baker. As discussed below,
none of these developments can override our
obligation to follow (rather than lead) on the
issue of whether a state is required to extend
marriage to same-gender couples. At best,
the developments relied upon are ambiguous
and certainly do not compel the conclusion
that the Supreme Court will interpret the
Fourteenth Amendment to require every
state to extend marriage to same-gender
couples, regardless of contrary state law.
B.
Equal
Discrimination

Protection–Gender

Plaintiffs argue that defining marriage to
exclude same-gender unions is based upon

gender stereotyping where “the law
presumed women to be legally, socially, and
financially dependent upon men.” But this
case involves no disparate treatment based
upon gender that might invite intermediate
scrutiny. Utah's constitutional and statutory
provisions, Utah Const. art. I, § 29 and Utah
Code §§ 30–1–2(5), 30–1–4.1, enacted in
1977 and 2004, simply define marriage as
the legal union of a man and a woman and
do not recognize any other domestic union,
i.e., same-gender marriage. They apply to
same-gender male couples and same-gender
female couples alike.
C. Equal Protection–Sexual Orientation
Plaintiffs argue that defining marriage to
exclude same-gender unions is a form of
sexual orientation discrimination triggering
heightened scrutiny. The Supreme Court has
yet to decide the level of scrutiny attendant
to classifications based upon sexual
orientation, but this court has rejected
heightened scrutiny. Although Plaintiffs
argue that our precedent does not justify
such a position, one panel of this court may
not overrule another absent superseding en
banc review or a Supreme Court decision
invalidating our precedent. Neither has
occurred here.
D. Due Process–Fundamental Right
The Plaintiffs contend that they are not
relying upon a fundamental right to samegender marriage, but instead a fundamental
right to marriage simpliciter. They contend
that freedom to marry is self-defining and
without reference to those who assert it or
have been excluded from it. Of course, the
difficulty with this is that marriage does not
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exist in a vacuum; it is a public institution,
and states have the right to regulate it. That
right necessarily encompasses the right to
limit marriage and decline to recognize
marriages which would be prohibited; were
the rule as the Plaintiffs contend, that
marriage is a freestanding right, Utah's
prohibition on bigamy would be an invalid
restriction. That proposition has been
soundly rejected. Likewise, were marriage a
freestanding right without reference to the
parties, Utah would be hard-pressed to
prohibit marriages for minors under 15 and
impose conditions for other minors.

given the ephemeral nature of substantive
due process, recognition of fundamental
rights requires a right deeply rooted in
United States history and tradition, and a
careful and precise definition of the right at
issue. Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs'
contention, it is entirely appropriate for the
State to characterize the right sought as one
of “same-gender marriage” and focus
attention on its recent development. Perhaps
someday same-gender marriage will become
part of this country's history and tradition,
but that is not a choice this court should
make.

As noted, the Court has recognized a
fundamental right to marriage protected by
substantive
due
process. As
such,
restrictions on the right are subject to strict
scrutiny: they must be narrowly tailored to
further compelling state interests. But it is a
stretch to cast those cases in support of a
fundamental right to same-gender marriage.

Much of this court's opinion is dedicated to
finding otherwise by separating marriage
from procreation and expounding on how
other substantive due process and privacy
concepts, including personal autonomy,
dignity, family relationships, reproductive
rights, and the like, are the antecedents and
complements of same-gender marriage. But
we should be reluctant to announce a
fundamental right by implication. Not only
is that beyond our power, it is completely
arbitrary and impractical; as in this case, a
state should be allowed to adopt change if
desired and implement it. As these
proceedings demonstrate, the State has a
much better handle on what statutory and
administrative provisions are involved, and
what is necessary to implement change, than
we do.

Here's why. First, same-gender marriage is a
very recent phenomenon; for centuries
“marriage” has been universally understood
to require two persons of opposite gender.
Indeed, this case is better understood as an
effort to extend marriage to persons of the
same gender by redefining marriage.
Second, nothing suggests that the term
“marriage” as used in those cases had any
meaning other than what was commonly
understood for centuries. Courts do not
decide what is not before them. That the
Court did not refer to a “right to interracial
marriage,” or a “right to inmate marriage”
cannot obscure what was decided; the
Supreme Court announced a right with
objective meaning and contours. Third,

E. Equal Protection–Rational Basis
Plaintiffs contend and the district court so
found that the provisions cannot be
sustained under rational basis review. The
State offered several rationales including (1)
encouraging responsible procreation given
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the unique ability of opposite-gender
couples to conceive, (2) effective parenting
to benefit the offspring, and (3) proceeding
with caution insofar as altering and
expanding the definition of marriage. The
district court rejected these rationales based
on a lack of evidence and/or a lack of a
rational connection between excluding
same-gender couples from marriage and the
asserted justification.
Equal protection “is essentially a direction
that all persons similarly situated should be
treated alike.” Given the provisions in this
case, we should look at the definition of
marriage and the exclusion of same-gender
couples and inquire whether “the
classification ... is rationally related to a
legitimate state interest.”
To the extent the district court thought that
the State had any obligation to produce
evidence, surely it was incorrect. Though the
State is not precluded from relying upon
evidence, rational basis analysis is a legal
inquiry. The district court seems to have
misunderstood the essence of rational basis
review: extreme deference, the hallmark of
judicial restraint. The State could rely upon
any plausible reason and contend that the
classification might arguably advance that
reason. Plaintiffs had the burden of refuting
all plausible reasons for the challenged
amendment and statutes.
Whether a reason actually motivated the
electorate or the legislature is irrelevant;
neither is required to state its reason for a
choice. Legislative choices involve linedrawing, and the fact that such line-drawing
may result in some inequity is not
determinative. Accordingly, an enactment

may be over-inclusive and/or underinclusive yet still have a rational basis. The
fact that the classification could be improved
or is ill-advised is not enough to invalidate
it; the political process is responsible for
remedying perceived problems.
Judged against these standards, Utah should
prevail on a rational basis analysis. Plaintiffs
have not overcome their “heavy burden” of
demonstrating that the provisions are
“arbitrary and irrational,” that no electorate
or legislature could reasonably believe the
underlying legislative facts to be true. It is
biologically undeniable that opposite-gender
marriage has a procreative potential that
same-gender marriage lacks. The inherent
differences between the biological sexes are
permissible legislative considerations, and
indeed distinguish gender from those
classifications that warrant strict scrutiny.
In Nguyen v. I.N.S., for example, the Court
upheld a legislative scheme imposing more
onerous burdens on unwed fathers than
unwed mothers to prove the citizenship of
their foreign-born children because of the
opportunity for mothers to develop a
relationship with their child at childbirth.
The Court recognized important government
interests in ensuring both a biological
relationship between the citizen and the
child and an opportunity to develop a
meaningful parent-child relationship. The
Court stressed the government's critically
important “interest in ensuring some
opportunity for a tie between citizen father
and foreign born child” as a proxy for the
opportunity for connection childbirth affords
the mother. Nguyen suggests that when it
comes to procreation, gender can be
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considered and that biological relationships
are significant interests.
Nor is the State precluded from considering
procreation in regulating marriage. Merely
because the Court has discussed marriage as
a fundamental right apart from procreation
or other rights including contraception, child
rearing, and education does not suggest that
the link between marriage and procreation
may not be considered when the State
regulates marriage. The Court's listing of
various rights from time to time is intended
to be illustrative of cases upholding a right
of privacy, ensuring that certain personal
decisions might be made “without
unjustified
government
interference.” Indeed, it is difficult to
separate
marriage
from
procreation
considering the State's interest in regulating
both. Even in Turner, where the Court
discussed marriage as a fundamental right
for inmates based upon other advantages of
marriage, the Court explained that “most
inmate marriages are formed in the
expectation that they will ultimately be fully
consummated” and mentioned the advantage
of “legitimation of children born out of
wedlock.” It goes without saying that there
are procreative and personal dimensions of
marriage, but a state may place greater
emphasis on one or the other as it regulates
marriage without violating the Fourteenth
Amendment.
It is also undeniable that the State has an
important interest in ensuring the well-being
of resulting offspring, be they planned or
unplanned. To that end, the State can offer
marriage and its benefits to encourage
unmarried parents to marry and married

parents to remain so. Thus, the State could
seek to limit the marriage benefit to
opposite-gender couples completely apart
from history and tradition. Far more
opposite-gender couples will produce and
care for children than same-gender couples
and perpetuation of the species depends
upon procreation. Consistent with the
greatest good for the greatest number, the
State could rationally and sincerely believe
that children are best raised by two parents
of opposite gender (including their
biological parents) and that the present
arrangement provides the best incentive for
that outcome. Accordingly, the State could
seek to preserve the clarity of what marriage
represents and not extend it.
Of course, other states may disagree. And it
is always possible to argue that there are
exceptions. But on this issue we should
defer. To be sure, the constant refrain in
these cases has been that the States'
justifications are not advanced by excluding
same-gender couples from marriage. But
that is a matter of opinion; any
“improvement” on the classification should
be left to the state political process.
At the very least, same-gender marriage is a
new social phenomenon with unknown
outcomes and the State could choose to
exercise caution. Utah's justifications for not
extending marriage to include same-gender
couples are not irrefutable. But they don't
need to be; they need only be based upon
“any reasonably conceivable state of facts.”
In conducting this analysis, we must defer to
the predictive judgments of the electorate
and the legislature and those judgments need
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not be based upon complete, empirical
evidence.
No matter how many times we are reminded
that (1) procreative ability and effective
parenting are not prerequisites to oppositegender marriage (exclusion of same-gender
couples is under-inclusive), (2) it is doubtful
that the behavior of opposite-gender couples
is affected by same-gender marriage (lack of
evidence), (3) the evidence is equivocal
concerning the effects of gender diversity on
parenting (lack of evidence) and (4) the
present scheme disadvantages the children
of same-gender couples (exclusion is overinclusive), the State's classification does not
need to be perfect. It can be under-inclusive
and over-inclusive and need only arguably
serve the justifications urged by the State. It
arguably does.
That the Constitution does not compel the
State to recognize same-gender marriages
within its own borders demonstrates a
fortiori that it need not recognize those
solemnized without. Unlike the federal
government in Windsor, a state has the
“historic and essential authority to define the
marital relation” as applied to its residents
and citizens. To that end, Utah has the
authority to decline to recognize valid
marriages from other states that are

inconsistent with its public policy choices.
To conclude otherwise would nationalize the
regulation of marriage, thereby forcing each
state “to substitute the statutes of other states
for its own statutes dealing with a subject
matter concerning which it is competent to
legislate.” Such a result runs in direct
contravention of the law of comity between
states and its uncontroversial corollary that
marriage laws necessarily vary from state to
state.
The State has satisfied its burden on rational
basis review. One only need consider the
reams of sociological evidence urged by the
parties and the scores of amicus briefs on
either side to know that the State's position
is (at the very least) arguable. It most
certainly is not arbitrary, irrational, or based
upon legislative facts that no electorate or
legislature could conceivably believe.
Though the Plaintiffs would weigh the
interests of the State differently and discount
the procreation, child-rearing, and caution
rationales, that prerogative belongs to the
electorate and their representatives.
We should resist the temptation to become
philosopher-kings, imposing our views
under
the
guise
of
constitutional
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.
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“The Marriage Ruling ‘Streak’ and What It Means, Made Simple”
SCOTUSblog
Lyle Denniston
August 12, 2014
In sports, a “streak” can say a lot about
talent, endurance — and plain luck. Cal
Ripken, Jr., of the Baltimore Orioles set a
major league baseball record by playing in
2,632 consecutive games. The University of
Connecticut’s women’s basketball team
owns the longest string of victories in the
college basketball ranks — ninety games in
a row.
In law, attorney Thurgood Marshall had a
string of victories (sometimes interrupted by
defeats) in his campaign to achieve racial
desegregation in public education, and
attorney Ruth Bader Ginsburg did much the
same in advancing the women’s rights
revolution.
But perhaps nothing in
constitutional history matches the swiftly
developing “streak” of court rulings in favor
of same-sex marriage. Still, the actual
meaning of that “streak” is open to debate
— even about whether it is a streak. Let’s
try to sort it out, simply.
First, what are we talking about
here? Courts have been issuing decisions
about the government’s power to ban samesex marriage since 1993, in a Hawaii case,
but that didn’t actually work out to permit
such marriages. In fact, that ruling,
favorable to the idea, produced just the
opposite: a swift and long-running
backlash, a wave of federal and state laws
and state constitutional amendments
reinforcing long-standing opposition to gays
and lesbians seeking to wed.

If one starts with a ruling by the highest
state court in Massachusetts in 2003, a
decision that did actually open marriage to
same-sex couples (the first such ruling with
a definite effect), there has been a steady
trend strongly in that direction, but it has not
been continuous.
What most people have been talking about
lately has been a line of court decisions that
have come down over the past thirteen-plus
months. The starting point in that cycle was
the Supreme Court’s decision in United
States v. Windsor, in late June of last year.
In that ruling, the Court struck down a key
part of a 1996 federal law, the Defense of
Marriage Act — one of the laws that had
been prompted by the Hawaii court decision
three years before. The Court nullified a
provision in the law that allowed federal
marital benefits to go only to opposite-sex
couples. Those benefits, the Court majority
said, must be available to same-sex couples
who were legally married under their own
state laws — for example, in Massachusetts,
or other states that had since chosen to allow
such unions.
The Windsor decision, however, actually
decided nothing about whether states could
do what the federal law had done — that is,
limit
marriage
to
opposite-sex
couples. Even so, the opinion did say many
favorable things about the need to show
respect for the families of same-sex married
couples.
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In the wake of that decision, a “streak”
supposedly has developed, with court after
court, at federal and state levels, declaring
that the Windsor decision undermined state
bans on same-sex marriage and striking
those bans down.
In most public discussion, it has been said
— on this blog, too — that there had been
an unbroken string of court victories for
same-sex marriage. But this week, a state
judge in Tennessee appeared to have broken
that string by upholding his state’s ban in a
same-sex couple’s divorce case.
The reality, which also has just become
clear, is that the “streak” never really got
started as a string of winning decisions for
same-sex marriage. It is a fact that the first
court ruling to apply the Windsor decision
came in a New Jersey trial court in
September 2013, nullifying a state ban, but
that was mainly an expansion of an earlier,
pre-Windsor ruling by the state’s Supreme
Court. The first court ruling to start from
scratch on the issue went the other way; a
state judge in Mississippi — in a samesex divorce case — on December 6
dismissed a constitutional challenge to that
state’s ban. It was only a two-page order, so
no one can be sure what reasons the judge
had.
The string of victories that would in fact
come after the Windsor decision started on
December 19, with a ruling by the New
Mexico Supreme Court, although that
decision relied on
the
New
Mexico
constitution to nullify that state’s ban.
Then, one by one, federal and state courts
began
applying
the Windsor decision

directly to strike down state bans under the
federal Constitution. (Even that string was
interrupted in May, when a state judge in
Tampa dismissed a same-sex marriage
divorce case, seeking to challenge that
state’s ban. Later, four state judges in other
courts in Florida would rule in favor of
same-sex marriage.)
But, even if the “streak” has not been an
unbroken one, the pace and frequency of the
decisions that did go against the state bans
is, surely, unprecedented. Although groups
that have been closely monitoring the string
of rulings do disagree on the actual number
of victories for same-sex marriage, it is
somewhere around thirty, or more.
What the occasional breaks in the “streak”
illustrate, though, is that the outcome is not
necessarily predictable as other courts take
on the question, and an ultimate Supreme
Court decision in favor of same-sex
marriage is hardly inevitable.
But then does the “streak,” such as it is,
have any real meaning? It certainly
does. As the number of rulings won by
same-sex couples has risen, judges later
joining in the trend have relied upon the
strength of that trend. Each judge is obliged
to decide the issue individually, but most of
them recognize a consensus when they see
one as vivid as this one has been.
Moreover, the strength of the trend has also
led attorney generals in several states to
decide that a defense of their state’s ban is
no longer a promising strategy, and they
have given up that defense. Others in favor
of the bans have tried to step up to make a
defense, but that has had its limits.
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The “streak” also has created a lower-court
record that, even if it does not produce the
same result each time, will surely impress
the Supreme Court when it finally allows
itself to be drawn into the fray. Some
historians have said that they know of no
instance when the Court has bucked a trend
such as this one has become.
But the very nature of that trend can also be
an argument against the Supreme Court
choosing to get involved itself. If the only
breaks in the “streak” have been a handful of
rulings by divorce-court judges, none of
whom so far has gone deeply into the issue
before ruling, the Court could conclude that
the issue is working itself out sufficiently in
lower courts.
The Court is often led to take on a
controversy if the lower courts have split —
at least when such splits are vivid and
meaningful. The supporters of bans on
same-sex marriage have been arguing that
there is already a split of that significance on
this issue, despite the “streak.” They are
relying on the fact that the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in 2006
explicitly upheld Nebraska’s ban on such
marriages, and they also cite a string of state
supreme court decisions against same-sex
marriage pleas.
Every one of those decisions, though, came
out before the Supreme Court decision in the
Windsor case. If that ruling changed the
constitutional landscape, as so many judges
have since concluded, the Supreme Court
could conclude that a current split would

provide a more compelling reason to take on
the question.
A number of observers who listened to
hearings held last week in the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit came away
with a clear impression that a majority of
that three-judge panel might well uphold one
or more of the state bans in effect in the four
states involved in that hearing.
That kind of a break in the current “streak”
would certainly demonstrate that there is a
real division of opinion on the question, one
that it would take a Supreme Court decision
to resolve.
Of course, the existence of a genuine split
on a major constitutional question such as
this one does not necessarily dictate that the
Court will be drawn in. The Justices do not
agree to settle every lower-court conflict, by
any means. They have almost complete
discretion in what to put on their docket for
decision.
One thing about the “streak” does appear to
be quite clear at the moment. Its pace has
been such that the Supreme Court is likely to
act on one or more cases soon after it returns
to Washington in September, ending its
summer recess. Any grant of review early
in the Term would almost certainly mean a
final decision by next summer.
It that were to happen, it would be a
remarkable
historic
journey:
from Windsor to a definitive ruling on samesex marriage in just two years’ time.
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“Comparing Two Federal Appellate Court Decisions on Same-Sex Marriage”
Verdict
David S. Kemp
July 30, 2014
On Monday, a panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled that
Virginia’s ban on same-sex marriages in that
state violates the Due Process and Equal
Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. This
decision follows closely on the heels of a
decision by a panel of the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, which came
to the same conclusion just over a month
ago with respect to Utah’s same-sex
marriage ban.
In this column, I examine the Fourth Circuit
panel majority’s reasoning striking down
Virginia’s ban and compare that with the
reasoning employed by the Tenth Circuit
panel that struck Utah’s similar law last
month. I note that the majority opinions
from both courts closely track one another,
both in precedents cited and in reasoning. I
also discuss the similarities and differences
between the dissenting opinions and argue
that these dissenting opinions likely indicate
the focal points of these cases if and when
they reach the U.S. Supreme Court.
Bostic v. Schaefer: The Fourth Circuit
Strikes Down Virginia’s Same-Sex
Marriage Ban
A panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Fourth Circuit held Monday that Virginia’s
constitutional and statutory bans on samesex marriage are unconstitutional. In a 2-1
decision, the panel quickly disposed of the
arguments put forth by the proponents of the

law, making it the second federal appeals
court this summer to rule against a state’s
same-sex marriage ban.
The panel first considered the threshold
question whether the plaintiffs had judicial
standing to bring their claims in federal
court at all. Finding that they had, the court
turned to a second preliminary question:
whether the U.S. Supreme Court’s summary
dismissal of a case in 1972 “for want of a
substantial federal question” precluded the
instant case. That prior case, Baker v.
Nelson, involved an appeal from the
Minnesota Supreme Court upholding a ban
on same-sex marriage. Summary dismissals
are considered to be rulings on the merits,
but they do not carry the same precedential
value as an opinion after briefing and oral
arguments. They do, however, prevent lower
courts from “coming to opposite conclusions
on the precise issues presented and
necessarily decided by those actions” except
“when doctrinal developments indicate
otherwise.” The majority found that the
Supreme Court’s decisions in Lawrence v.
Texas, in 2003, and United States v.
Windsor, a decade later, constituted such
doctrinal
developments.
Thus,
it
concluded, Baker was no longer binding.
The panel then turned to the opponents’
Fourteenth Amendment arguments. First, it
considered the appropriate level of
constitutional scrutiny: rational basis review
or some form of heightened scrutiny. The
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laws’ opponents argued that the ban
infringes on their right to marriage, which
the Supreme Court has recognized as a
fundamental right subject to strict scrutiny.
The proponents agreed that marriage is a
fundamental right, but argued that the
fundamental right to marriage does not
encompass a right to same-sex marriage and
thus that the law triggers only rational basis
review. The panel found that the Supreme
Court’s precedents on the fundamental right
to marriage do not define the rights in
question as “the right to interracial
marriage,” “the right of people owing child
support to marry,” and “the right of prison
inmates to marry”; rather these seminal
cases speak of “a broad right to marry that is
not
circumscribed
based
on
the
characteristics of the individuals seeking to
exercise that right.” Thus, the panel held, the
right to marriage encompasses the right to
marry the person of one’s choosing and
therefore includes the right to same-sex
marriage. Finding that the law implicated
the fundamental right of marriage, the panel
applied strict scrutiny. Under this level of
review, the government must show that the
laws in question are narrowly tailored and
necessary to further compelling state
interests.
The law’s proponents put forth five interests
that they argued justified the laws: “(1)
Virginia’s federalism-based interest in
maintaining control over the definition of
marriage within its borders, (2) the history
and tradition of opposite-sex marriage, (3)
protecting the institution of marriage, (4)
encouraging responsible procreation, and (5)
promoting
the
optimal
childrearing
environment.” Even assuming that each of

these reasons was indeed compelling, the
panel still found that the laws prohibiting
same-sex marriage were not sufficiently
narrowly tailored to further any of these
interests.
In reaching its conclusion that Virginia’s
ban on same-sex marriage violates the
Constitution, the panel notably placed great
weight on the Supreme Court’s language
in Lawrence and Windsor recognizing the
equal legitimacy of gay couples’ intimate
relationships.
Comparison to the Tenth
Decision in Kitchen v. Herbert

Circuit’s

At the end of June, a panel of the U.S. Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit issued
a similar ruling striking down Utah’s samesex marriage ban. In that case, the majority
also found that the plaintiffs had standing to
challenge the state law and that Baker v.
Nelson was no longer binding authority.
The law’s proponents provided four
allegedly compelling state interests: “(1)
fostering a child-centric marriage culture
that encourages parents to subordinate their
own interests to the needs of their children;
(2) children being raised by their biological
mothers and fathers—or at least by a
married mother and father—in a stable
home; (3) ensuring adequate reproduction;
and (4) accommodating religious freedom
and reducing the potential for civic strife.”
The Tenth Circuit panel’s reasoning was
very similar to that of the Fourth Circuit
panel, albeit more directly critical of the
law. The panel questioned the state’s
purported interests, stating that “each of the
appellants’ justifications rests fundamentally
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on a sleight of hand in which same-sex
marriage is used as a proxy for a different
characteristic shared by both same-sex and
some opposite-sex couples.” However, even
assuming the interests are compelling, the
panel found the argument “that procreative
couples must be channeled into committed
relationships in order to promote the State’s
interests in childbearing and optimal
childrearing . . . fails because the prohibition
on same-sex marriage has an insufficient
causal connection to the State’s articulated
goals.”
I found the Fourth Circuit’s reasoning
somewhat more thoroughly explained and
supported as to the question whether samesex marriage is encompassed in the
fundamental right to marriage, particularly
in that it more directly relied on Loving v.
Virginia to reach its conclusion.
The Dissenting Opinions
Judge Paul Kelly concurred in part and
dissented in part with the Tenth Circuit
panel majority. He concurred only with
respect to the issue of standing and dissented
with respect to the treatment of Baker v.
Nelson as no longer binding, the conclusion
that same-sex marriage is encompassed
within the fundamental right to marry (and
therefore he concluded that under the
rational basis test, the law should be
upheld).
Judge Paul Niemeyer dissented from the
Fourth Circuit panel’s majority opinion and
argued that the fundamental right to

marry does not include a right to marry
someone of the same sex.
While Baker v. Nelson is certainly important
and a determination of its applicability may
ultimately affect the outcome of the issue if
it reaches the U.S. Supreme Court, the scope
of the fundamental right to marry is at the
crux of both cases, as the two dissents
illustrate.
It seems to me disingenuous to deny the
strong parallels between these cases
and Loving. The dissents both contend that
the fundamental right to marry is
distinguishable from a right to marry
someone of the same sex, and that the latter
is a “new” right that departs from history
and tradition. Yet at the same time, they
deny
that Loving involved
a
similar departure, even though marriage had
historically been denied to interracial
couples.
To attempt to characterize same-sex
marriage as a category separate and apart
from marriage as an institution is to ignore
exactly what it is that gay couples seek—
recognition of their relationships as equal to
those of straight couples. As Justice
Kennedy wrote in Lawrence, and as quoted
by the Tenth Circuit majority, the drafters of
the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
“knew times can blind us to certain truths
and later generations can see that laws once
thought necessary and proper in fact serve
only to oppress. As the Constitution endures,
persons in every generation can invoke its
principles in their own search for greater
freedom.”
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“Virginia Wants Gay Marriage Ban Review by Supreme Court”
Bloomberg
Andrew Harris
August 8, 2014
Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring, a
first-term Democrat and supporter of
marriage equality, said he asked the U.S.
Supreme Court to review a ruling that struck
down a gay marriage ban in his state in
order to get a quick final word on the issue.
Herring’s request, announced in a statement
today, would be the third such bid lodged
with the high court this week, following
requests by lawyers defending similar
measures in Utah and Oklahoma. Herring’s
petition wasn’t immediately available at the
court.
Laws barring gay couples from marrying in
the three states were struck down by federal
judges, in rulings that were upheld by
appeals courts. The Supreme Court has
discretion to accept cases for review. Other
challenges involving gay marriage bans are
before U.S. appeals courts in Cincinnati,
Chicago and San Francisco.
Several Supreme Court justices have
expressed reluctance to tackle the issue, with
Anthony Kennedy and Sonia Sotomayor
suggesting in a separate gay-rights case last
year that it’d be too soon for a high court
ruling. Likening the Virginia ban to its onetime prohibition of interracial marriage,
Herring said, “Virginia got that case wrong.
Now we have a chance to get it right.”
Almost There
“Many brave men and women have fought
for years for the constitutional guarantee of

marriage equality, and now, we are almost
there,” Herring said.
Same-sex marriage is legal in 19 states and
the District of Columbia. Decisions striking
down bans in nine states are on hold pending
the outcome of appeals.
Each side in the Virginia case has asked the
U.S. appeals court in Richmond to delay its
decision pending a resolution by the
Supreme Court, a spokesman for Herring,
Michael Kelly, said today.
Less than a month into his term, Herring
announced his office would reverse the
position of his Republican predecessor,
Kenneth Cucinnelli. The new attorney
general argued for his state’s law to be
declared unconstitutional and then for the
ruling to be upheld on appeal.
Law Defender
Defending the law was Norfolk County
court clerk George E. Schaefer and Prince
William County court clerk Michele
McQuigg.
Nick Bouknight, a spokesman for the
Scottsdale,
Arizona-based
Alliance
Defending Freedom, whose lawyers
represented McQuigg, declined to comment
on whether the group would ask the
Supreme Court to review the Virginia case.
Jeffrey Brooke, an attorney for Schaefer,
didn’t immediately return a call seeking
comment.
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The cases are Bostic v. Schaefer, 14-1167,
Bostic v. Rainey, 14-1169 and Bostic v.
McQuigg, 14-1173, U.S. Court of Appeals,
Fourth Circuit (Richmond).
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“Supreme Court Blocks Virginia Same-Sex Marriages”
Washington Blade
Chris Johnson
August 20, 2014
The U.S. Supreme Court agreed to a stay
Wednesday on a federal appeals court’s
ruling against Virginia’s ban on same-sex
marriage, blocking same-sex marriages from
taking place this week in the Old Dominion.
Without explanation, the court announced
in a single-page order it has stayed the ruling
by the U.S. Fourth Circuit of Appeals in
Schaefer v. Bostic, which affirmed
Virginia’s prohibition on same-sex marriage
is unconstitutional.
Although Chief Justice John Roberts is
responsible for stay requests in the Fourth
Circuit, the order indicates he referred the
matter to the entire court. The vote by the
Supreme Court on the decision isn’t
included in the order.
The court adds that if the court ends up
declining a writ of certiorari to hear the case,
the stay will terminate automatically. But if
the court decides to hear the case, the stay
will continue until judgment is issued.
Had the court declined to issue a stay,
clerks’ offices in Virginia could have started
distributing marriage licenses to same-sex
couples at 8 am on Thursday. That’s when
the Fourth Circuit was set to issue the
mandate on its decision.
Evan Wolfson, president of Freedom to
Marry, said the stay decision from the
Supreme Court “underscores of the
urgency” of a national resolution in favor of
marriage equality.

“Americans across the country are being
deprived of the freedom to marry and
respect for their lawful marriages, as well as
the tangible protections and precious dignity
and happiness that marriage brings,”
Wolfson said. “It is time for the Supreme
Court to affirm what more than thirty courts
have held in the past year: marriage
discrimination violates the Constitution,
harms families, and is unworthy of
America.”
The Supreme Court halted same-sex
marriages in Virginia after Prince William
County Circuit Court Clerk Michèle
McQuigg, who’s defending the state’s ban
on same-sex marriage in court, requested the
stay from justices. Attorneys representing
same-sex couples in the lawsuit — both the
Bostic and the Harris plaintiffs — had asked
the court to decline the stay, but the
Commonwealth of Virginia on behalf of
Virginia Registrar of Deeds Janet Rainey
filed a brief agreeing that a stay should be
put in place.
Prior to the announcement from the
Supreme Court, the anti-gay legal firm
Alliance Defending Freedom, which is
defending Virginia’s marriage ban on behalf
of McQuigg, followed up with a response
insisting that a stay on the Fourth Circuit
decision is necessary to prevent harm to the
state.
“The balance of the harms thus reduces to
this: the Bostic and Harris Respondents
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have identified potential harms (e.g., a delay
in obtaining state recognition of their
relationships) that will result only if they
ultimately prevail in this case, whereas
Clerk McQuigg and Registrar Rainey have
identified certain harms (e.g., enjoining a
duly enacted state constitutional provision)
that will result as soon as the Fourth Circuit
issues its mandate,” writes senior counsel
Byron Babione. “That balance tips sharply
in favor of staying the Fourth Circuit’s
mandate.”
The litigation seeking same-sex marriage in
Virginia itself has already been appealed to
the Supreme Court. Earlier this month,
Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring,
who has refused to defend Virginia’s
marriage law in court, filed an appeal on
behalf of the state. Alliance Defending
Freedom has already pledged to file a
similar appeal seeking to uphold the ban.
Following the decision from the Supreme
Court, Herring said in a conference call with
reporters he wants an expedited resolution to
the case, which is why he already petitioned
the Supreme Court to review the Fourth
Circuit’s decision against the marriage law.
“It’s still difficult to expect Virginian folk to
wait to exercise what I believe is a
fundamental right, especially when we are
so close to our goal, and that is why I’ve
been pushing to expedite and get a ruling
from the Supreme Court that will
definitively answer the constitutional
questions about marriage equality and
permanently protect the families of
Virginia’s same-sex couples,” Herring said.

Asked by the Washington Blade to respond
to critics who would say it’s disingenuous to
call Virginia’s ban on same-sex marriage
unconstitutional on one hand, but support a
stay on a ruling against it on the other,
Herring emphasized he’s pushing for a
speedy resolution to the case in favor of
same-sex couples.
“I support and will continue to fight for
equal treatment under the law, and I’m
going to continue to do that,” Herring said.
“But at the same, I recognize that until the
Supreme Court makes its decision that
outcome is not certain. So, to those who are
tired of their state not treating them fairly
and equally, I am working as hard as I can to
fight for equality. I worked for it in the
district court, I fought for it in the Fourth
Circuit and I’ll fight for it in the Supreme
Court.”
The American Foundation for Equal Rights
announced after the stay decision was
announced that it’ll file a brief in support of
the petition already filed by Virginia
Attorney General Mark Herring calling on
the Supreme Court to take up the case.
“The federal court system agrees, the
majority of Americans agree, and the
President of the United States agrees that it
is time this country treats its same-sex
couples and their children just the same as
all other loving families,” said plaintiffs’
lead co-counsel David Boies of Boies,
Schiller & Flexner, LLP. “We are confident
that when the Supreme Court reviews the
Bostic case, it too will agree and end the
flagrant injustice of segregating Americans
based on sexual orientation.”
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The decision to block the same-sex
marriages from occurring overturns a
decision from the Fourth Circuit, which
refused to grant a stay on its decision
striking down Virginia’s marriage ban.
But the high court’s decision to stay samesex marriages in Virginia is consistent with
other stay decisions it has issued in other
states following rulings in favor of marriage
equality.
In January, the court issued a stay on samesex marriages taking place in Utah as a
result of a district court ruling in the case of
Kitchen v. Herbert striking down the state’s
ban on gay nuptials. Additionally, the
court halted state recognition of these 1,300
marriages in Evans v. Utah after the U.S.
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals deemed the

state for the time being should consider
them valid.
Chris Gasek, senior fellow at the anti-gay
Family Research Council, claimed the
Supreme Court’s decision to stay same-sex
marriages in Virginia as a victory for
opponents of marriage equality.
“Today, the Supreme Court put a hold on
the Fourth Circuit ruling, allowing
Virginia’s law to continue to be enforced
while the Fourth Circuit’s opinion is
appealed,” Gasek said. “We are glad that the
Court saw the wisdom of slowing down the
judicial process in this instance so that
marriages will not be entered into that would
later have to be nullified. Such irresponsible
mayhem has been witnessed in Utah, and it
resulted in legal chaos for state residents and
state
officials.”
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“Fourth Circuit Calls Virginia’s Gay Marriage Ban “Segregation,” Strikes it
Down”
Slate
Mark Joseph Stern
July 28, 2014
On Monday, the 4th Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled that Virginia’s gay marriage
ban is unconstitutional, the latest victory for
marriage equality in a unbroken string of
triumphs since
the
Supreme
Court overturned DOMA in 2013. The
opinion included no stay; until the Supreme
Court steps in, then, gay couples in Virginia
may get married starting now.
The judges of the 2–1 majority labeled the
state’s ban “segregation” and held that,
because it targeted a disfavored minority and
implicated a fundamental right, it should be
subject to strict scrutiny. It’s clear that, to
the majority, laws like Virginia’s represent
little more than bald bigotry:
[I]nertia and apprehension are not
legitimate bases for denying samesex couples due process and equal
protection of the laws. Civil marriage
is one of the cornerstones of our way
of life. It allows individuals to
celebrate and publicly declare their
intentions
to
form
lifelong
partnerships,
which
provide
unparalleled
intimacy,
companionship, emotional support,
and security. The choice of whether
and whom to marry is an intensely
personal decision that alters the
course of an individual’s life.
Denying same-sex couples this
choice
prohibits
them
from
participating fully in our society,
which is precisely the type of

segregation that the Fourteenth
Amendment cannot countenance.
Although the court struck down only
Virginia’s marriage ban, the 4th Circuit also
has jurisdiction over Maryland, West
Virginia, South Carolina, and North
Carolina. The latter three states still ban gay
marriage—but today’s ruling throws those
laws in serious jeopardy.
The majority opinion, written by Judge
Henry Franklin Floyd and joined by Judge
Roger Gregory, is most notable for its
systematic dismantling of Virginia’s
painfully prejudiced, laughably lousy
arguments against gay marriage. The state
centered its arguments around the idea that
because gay couples cannot have biological
children together, they simply don’t deserve
to get married. When asked why infertile
straight couples can still marry, the state
responded that these couples set a “positive
example for couples who can have
unintended children, encouraging them to
marry.” Here’s Floyd on this puzzling
theory:
We see no reason why committed
same-sex couples cannot serve as
similar role models. … Allowing
infertile opposite-sex couples to
marry does nothing to further the
government’s goal of channeling
procreative conduct into marriage.
Thus, excluding same-sex couples
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from marriage due to their inability
to have unintended children makes
little sense.
Floyd also had some fun with Virginia’s
other major argument—the claim that gay
marriage somehow increases out-of-wedlock
births among straight people, a societal ill
since children do better with married
parents. The idea that gay marriage spurs
out-of-wedlock births, the court rightly
notes, is pure nonsense, bigoted magical
thinking barely concealed as legalistic
casuistry. But the second half of the state’s
formulation is quite true: Children do tend to
do better with married parents. Thus,
Virginia’s
marriage
ban
actually harms children, denying them the
right to have legally wedded parents.
In his bitter dissent, Judge Paul Niemeyer
edges toward what we might call full Scalia,
repeatedly demeaning the value of gay
people’s relationships and families. Gay
marriage bans, Niemeyer writes, are

necessary to secure “stable family units” and
to “giv[e] children an identity.” Without gay
marriage bans, the “political order resulting
from [these] stable family units” will be
shattered, and states may be forced to
recognize “polygamous or incestuous
relationships.”
This last quote directly cites Scalia—in
dissent. That’s what so odd about
Niemeyer’s decision: As an appellate judge,
he’s bound by the Supreme Court’s
precedent. That precedent insists that a gay
marriage ban “demeans the [gay] couple,
whose moral and sexual choices the
Constitution protects,” violating “basic due
process and equal protection principles.” But
Niemeyer seems to be living in a world
where Scalia’s dissents became law and the
state retains unfettered power to disparage
gay people’s lives. Luckily for us, Scalia’s
dissents were just dissents—as is
Niemeyer’s opinion. Welcome to the fold,
Virginia.
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“Reading the Court’s Signals on Same-Sex Marriage”
SCOTUSblog
Lyle Denniston
August 22, 2014
Since early this year, the Supreme Court has
stepped back into the same-sex marriage
controversy five times. While it has done
little to explain those actions, it has sent
some signals about its thinking. Its most
important signals may have been those it
appeared to have sent Wednesday, in putting
off the issuance of marriage licenses to
same-sex couples in Virginia.
Between the nine lines of that order, the
Court implied that it will not be rushed into
a decision about which, if any, cases it is
going to review. And it left no doubt that
the Justices themselves, not the lawyers or
their clients, are in charge of the
timing. The Court, in short, has not yet
gotten caught up in the race to settle the
basic constitutional issue just as soon as it
could possibly do so.
The Court actually has said very little in the
nearly fourteen months since its five-to-four
decision in United States v. Windsor – the
ruling that did not deal with state power to
ban same-sex marriage but is being widely
interpreted by most lower courts as if it had
very much to do with that. It has not
granted any cases on the validity of a state
ban, and it has not even hinted — at least
not reliably — at what it might eventually
decide on the point.
The Virginia order, granting a county clerk’s
plea to head off the issuance of marriage
licenses to same-sex couples that would
have started the next morning, is the only

one of the five actions the Justices have
taken that will help shape their own eventual
role
in
confronting
the
basic
controversy.
All of the other four
dealt only with the situations in lower
courts.
The Court had been urged, by all sides in the
Virginia case, to speed up the process of
finding a case for review by turning a simple
request for delay into an actual, formal
petition — a move that could have cut short
several procedural steps, and set up the
Virginia case as a prime candidate for
review.
The Court silently refused the suggestion,
simply delaying things in Virginia until after
a county clerk actually files a petition for
review, in the usual form and on the usual
timetable. That was a clear sign that the
Court was doing its best to act as if it were
business as usual, even on this hot
constitutional controversy.
That development might well have slowed
down not only the county clerk’s petition,
but also the one already filed by state
officials in Virginia, which had seemed
likely to be in shape procedurally for early
consideration
for
possible
review. Knowing that another petition
involving the Virginia ban is on the way, the
Court may wait for it before acting on the
state’s separate petition.
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Unless the pace steps up significantly on
Virginia’s part of this controversy, the
petition by Virginia officials may lag behind
the one filed by Utah — one that seems to
be accelerating. The Utah case, in fact,
might be ready for the Court to examine as
early as next week or the week after — that
is, if the Court were in town, and in session,
and not on summer recess.
The Court, however, has given no sign that
it is going to take any definite action on the
new same-sex marriage cases, at least until it
returns to town in September from the recess
that began at the beginning of
July. Yesterday’s order, in fact, tended to
reinforce that outlook.
But what of the other four orders the Court
has issued this year – one in January, one in
June, and two in July? Any messages there?
Two of the orders — on January 6 and July
18 — delayed decisions by federal district
courts until the Tenth Circuit could consider
appeals of those decisions. In those cases,
the trial judges struck down Utah’s ban on
new same-sex marriages and the separate
ban on the state’s refusal to recognize
existing same-sex marriages. Later, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed the ruling against the
new marriage ban; the other case, on
recognition of existing marriages, awaits
review in that court.
In both cases, it was the state that asked to
delay implementation of the trial judges’
rulings. By granting those pleas, the Court
implied that it wanted an orderly review
process in lower courts, and was
sympathetic to the claim of state officials
that chaos might ensue if same-sex couples

were free to marry when the constitutional
controversy remained unsettled. (There
have, in fact, been hundreds of same-sex
marriages in intervals between lower court
rulings, and their validity remains
uncertain.)
Although many defenders of state bans have
interpreted those two orders as signaling that
the Court itself was likely to grant review of
the issue later, and, indeed, that there was a
good chance that the Court would overturn
the lower court decisions and uphold the
bans, only the former was probably an
intended message. The merits of the
decision are just too weighty for the Court to
be sending signals on how it would rule
when a case became fully developed before
it.
But no one knows for sure, because neither
of those orders was explained by the
Justices, and there were no noted dissents by
any of the nine members of the Court.
The other two orders from the Justices came
on June 4, dealing with a trial judge’s ruling
striking down an Oregon ban, and on July 9,
involving a trial judge’s ruling against a ban
in Pennsylvania. In a sense, those didn’t
really count: in neither was the plea for
delay made by state officials; in fact,
officials in both Oregon and Pennsylvania
had given up defending their states’ bans.
In the first of those two cases, a private
group that had been denied entry into the
case wanted to mount a defense; in the
second, a county clerk — who had no real
authority over the state’s policy on marriage
licenses and had been kept out of the case —
wanted to put on a defense.
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The full Court denied the Oregon plea, thus
sending a clear signal that an “outsider” to a
test case was not going to be given a chance
to stand in for the state to defend a
ban. That, in fact, had been the actual
decision the Court had issued on the same
day
that
it
issued
the Windsor
decision: Hollingsworth v. Perry, barring an
appeal by the proponents of the California
ban, the ballot measure known as
“Proposition 8.”
That Oregon denial then was cited, by title
only, as a precedent by Justice Samuel A.
Alito, Jr., when he turned aside the
Pennsylvania county clerk’s plea. Again,
the message was that this clerk, given the
actual nature of her duties, was an
“outsider.”
(By the way, the Court had no problem in
the Virginia case with the fact that the
request for delay there also came from a
county clerk. In Virginia, county clerks are
centrally involved in implementing the
state’s policy on marriage licenses, and they
have the authority to be in court on their
own. Indeed, the clerk – Michele B.
McQuigg of Prince William County — was
defending the ban after state officials
switched the state’s position and gave up the
defense that had been pursued by their
predecessors in office.)
There is no basis for the theory that, in those
two orders, the Court was signaling that it
supported a decision by state officials to
abandon a defense of a state constitutional
provision, or that it was implying that it
thought the trial judges were right in
nullifying the bans. The only real message

was that those who were asking for delay
were not legally entitled to ask.
Through all of this year, from January on,
the Court could not help but be aware of
what was happening in the lower courts,
with a string of decisions nullifying state
bans on same-sex marriage. The fact
that the Court has been drawn in on five
occasions has kept it in the middle of the
controversy, even if it has mostly kept its
own counsel about what it is thinking.
With a little more than five weeks until the
Justices assemble in their first private
Conference, in advance of the new Term
starting October 6, it is by no means clear
that any same-sex marriage case will be
ready for the Justices to consider it on
September 29. That depends, in part, on
whether the Court will have cases before it
one at a time, as each is ready, or in a
group., when several are ready.
The last scheduled day for distributing a
case for consideration by the Justices at the
September 29 meeting is September 10 —
now, just three weeks away. The pending
Utah case has a fair prospect of being ready
then, but there is reason to doubt at this
point that the pending Oklahoma and
Virginia cases will be complete. The
lawyers involved have said they were
working diligently to push matters along,
but the clock is against them for action by
the Justices at the outset of the new Term.
There will be plenty of time, though, to get a
case before the Court for decision during the
new Term. If a case is accepted for review
by sometime next January, it is almost
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certain to be decided before the end of
the Term, late next June.

Is a grant of review a certainty in coming
months? There is never a sufficiently strong
advance signal to predict that.
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“ACLU Opposes Time Extension in Utah’s Same-Sex Recognition Case”
The Salt Lake Tribune
Marissa Lang
August 19, 2014
Four gay and lesbian couples asked a federal
appeals court Tuesday to deny Utah extra
time to appeal a judge’s order requiring the
state to offer spousal benefits to same-sex
couples married in Utah.
The longer the appeal is dragged out, the
couples’ attorney said, the more harm will
be done.
"There are families who face financial,
emotional and dignitary harms every single
day [Utah] refuses to recognize their
marriages," wrote John Mejía, counsel for
the American Civil Liberties Union of Utah,
which represents the plaintiffs in this case.
"These real concrete harms mitigate strongly
against any further extensions in this case."
On Monday, the Utah attorney general’s
office asked the 10th Circuit Court of
Appeals for a one-month extension of the
Sept. 22 deadline set by the court for the
state’s appeal.
Giving the state until Oct. 22 to appeal the
Evans v. Utah lawsuit would allow the state
to better brief the court, the state argued,
given the "factually and legally complex"
nature of the case, and the fact that the
attorneys involved have a busy workload.
But on Tuesday, the ACLU said that’s not
good enough.
"[Utah has] had since January of this year,
when this case was filed, to deliberate about
the issues presented here and have

undoubtedly already done much of the
required research and writing needed,"
Mejía wrote. "It also cannot be said that the
defendants could not have foreseen the
timing of the present briefing schedule to
anticipate a need to shift resources and
priorities."
The Evans case is the state’s second legal
battle over same-sex marriage to reach the
10th Circuit, which in June upheld U.S.
District Court Judge Robert J. Shelby’s
historic decision in December on the
Kitchen v. Herbert lawsuit that toppled
Utah’s ban on same-sex marriage, allowing
gay and lesbian couples to wed in Utah for a
brief period of 17 days.
After the nation’s high court halted all samesex marriages, giving the state a chance to
appeal the ruling, Utah said its laws were
returned to their "status quo" and it would be
illegal for them to extend marital benefits to
same-sex spouses.
But in May, U.S. District Judge Dale A.
Kimball ordered Utah to do just that. The
judge found that denying these couples
spousal benefits was a violation of their
Fourteenth Amendment rights to equal
protection and due process.
"The State has placed plaintiffs and their
families in a state of legal limbo with respect
to adoptions, child care and custody,
medical decisions, employment and health
benefits, future tax implications, inheritance,
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and many other property and fundamental
rights associated with marriage," Kimball
wrote in his decision. "These legal
uncertainties and lost rights cause harm each
day that the marriage is not recognized."
This argument was used again in the motion
filed early Tuesday by the ACLU.
A stay put in place by the U.S. Supreme
Court blocked all movement toward doling
out spousal benefits to married same-sex
Utahns after Kimball and the 10th Circuit
denied similar requests from the state. That
stay will expire once the 10th Circuit has
ruled on the lawsuit.
It’s this indefinite hold that the ACLU said
is hurting Utah families.

Meanwhile, the state also continues to
defend its right to define marriage as a union
between one man and one woman by asking
the U.S. Supreme Court to take up its
Kitchen v. Herbert case — its last recourse
in Utah’s effort to revive its ban on samesex marriage, Amendment 3, which Utah
voters passed in 2004.
Virginia and Oklahoma have filed similar
petitions, and more states are expected to
file for a hearing before the nation’s high
court before the year’s end.
The U.S. Supreme Court is on break until
October. When the justices reconvene they
will decide which case — if any — they
may take up on the issue of state same-sex
marriage
legislation.

"While Plaintiffs’ counsel understand the
need for professional courtesy in agreeing to
extension requests," Mejía wrote, "they are
unable to do so when extensions will work
tangible harm to their clients."
Utah has contended that allowing same-sex
couples to apply for, and receive, marital
benefits would render the lawsuit moot and
undermine the judicial process to which the
state is entitled.
Federal appeals court Judge Paul J. Kelly,
who wrote a dissent when his colleagues
Judges Carlos F. Lucero and Jerome A.
Holmes refused to halt the granting of
benefits to same-sex spouses, has asserted
that the courts have been "running
roughshod over state laws which are
currently in force."
"It is disingenuous to contend that the state
will suffer no harm if the matter is not
stayed," he wrote.
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“Utah Seeks U.S. Supreme Review to Revive Gay-Marriage Ban”
Bloomberg
Joel Rosenblatt
August 6, 2014
Utah asked the U.S. Supreme Court to
revive its same-sex marriage ban, becoming
the first state to do so since the high court
last year struck down a law that barred the
federal government from recognizing gay
marriage.
Since that pivotal ruling in June 2013, gaymarriage advocates have tallied more than
two dozen lower-court victories without a
single defeat. Utah’s prohibition was the
first in that spate of cases to be found
unconstitutional by a federal appeals court.
The 5-4 ruling in U.S. v. Windsor is the high
court’s most definitive take on the
constitutional rights of gay couples. Striking
down a 1996 U.S. law that denied federal
benefits to legally married same-sex
spouses, the court’s majority said the
measure created a “second-tier marriage” for
gay couples.
While courts have consistently read last
year’s ruling as undercutting any rationale
for state bans, Utah argued the opposite in
yesterday’s petition for review. The state
said the June decision by the U.S. Court of
Appeals in Denver that its ban is
unconstitutional runs afoul of the conclusion
in the Windsor case that defining domestic
relations belongs with the states.
“There are dozens of cases that raise the
question whether the Constitution dictates a
single marriage definition,” according to
Utah’s filing. “If Utah prevails here, the

court will have necessarily concluded that
Utah is ‘competent’ to define marriage” and
the resolution of the case “can mark the end
of marriage litigation in all respects.”
Same-sex marriage is now allowed in 19
states and the District of Columbia.
Marriage Licenses
Utah’s voter-approved ban was first struck
down by a Salt Lake City federal judge on
Dec. 20. More than 1,000 couples received
marriage licenses from Dec. 23 to Jan. 6.
After the Supreme Court put the ruling on
hold to allow for an appeal, Utah refused to
grant marital benefits to those couples,
sparking even more litigation.
In yesterday’s petition, Utah cited previous
Supreme Court rulings that support states’
rights to define marriage. While defending
its ban in lower courts the state emphasized
that voters backed the 2004 law by an
almost 2-1 margin.
The state argued that its case is the “ideal
vehicle” to resolve the question of whether
such bans are legal because Utah’s
governor, attorney general and a majority of
its legislators are united in defending the
law. State officials in Oklahoma and
Virginia didn’t defend their bans that were
found unconstitutional by federal appeals
panels last month.
“My responsibility is to defend the state
constitution and its amendments as Utah
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citizens have enacted them,” Utah Attorney
General Sean Reyes, a Republican, said in
an e-mailed statement.
‘Majorities Overstep’
Shannon Minter, a lawyer who represents a
gay couple in the Utah case, responded to
the states’ rights argument by arguing that
“courts have to step in and act as a check
when majorities overstep and take rights
away from vulnerable minorities.”
“One of the most important roles that the
courts play in our democracy is enforcing
individual liberties, and the important
principle of equal protection of the laws,”
Minter said yesterday an interview.
Utah’s request for the Supreme Court to
weigh in comes at a time when public
support for gay marriage is growing,
reaching a new high of 55 percent in a
Gallup poll conducted May 8-11. The
nationwide poll, which had a margin of error
of 4 percentage points, showed 42 percent
opposed.
Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring
said in a statement yesterday he will petition
the Supreme Court Aug. 8 to review his
state’s ban. Herring, a Democrat who took
office in January refused to defend the ban
before it was struck down by trial and
appeals court judges, said he wants the final

resolution from the high court as soon as
possible.
‘Final Word’
“I believe the district and appeals courts
ruled correctly in striking down Virginia’s
discriminatory marriage ban, but it has long
been clear that the Supreme Court will likely
have the final word,” he said.
The Supreme Court could decide at its
September conference to accept or reject
either of the petitions from Utah and
Virginia. Its next nine-month term starts in
October.
Despite all the momentum in lower courts to
legalize gay marriage, several high court
justices from the Windsor majority have
signaled they aren’t especially eager to up
the issue right away.
Justices Anthony Kennedy and Sonia
Sotomayor suggested during arguments last
year in a separate gay-rights case
from California that it was too soon for a
Supreme Court ruling on gay marriage. Ruth
Bader Ginsburg has hinted she has a similar
view, saying the court moved too quickly in
1973 when it legalized abortion nationwide.
The Utah appeals court case is Kitchen v.
Herbert. The Virginia case is Bostic v.
Schaefer.
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“10th Circuit Upholds Same-Sex Marriage”
The Salt Lake Tribune
Jessica Miller, Kristen Stewart, & Pamela Manson
June 25, 2014
A federal appeals court on Wednesday ruled
that states outlawing same-sex marriage are
in violation of the U.S. Constitution.
By upholding a Utah judge’s decision, a
three-member panel of the 10th Circuit
Court of Appeals in Denver became the first
appeals court in the nation to rule on the
issue, setting a historic precedent that voterapproved bans on same-sex marriage violate
the Fourteenth Amendment rights of samesex couples to equal protection and due
process.
But the court immediately stayed the
implementation of its decision, pending an
anticipated appeal to the U.S. Supreme
Court.
Utah attorney general’s office
Wednesday it will initiate that appeal.

said

Meanwhile, the state could ask the 10th
Circuit Court to re-hear the matter before the
full court.
University of Utah law professor Clifford
Rosky called Wednesday’s ruling, "the most
important victory of the entire gay rights
movement."
It is the first time a federal appeals court has
recognized that same-sex couples have the
same fundamental right to marry as all
Americans, said Rosky, chairman of
Equality Utah’s board of directors.
"Very few courts have embraced the
fundamental rights argument and this court

seems to have completely embraced it and
applied ‘strict scrutiny,’ the highest standard
recognized under constitutional law," Rosky
said.
If the state asks the 10th Circuit Court to rehear the matter before the full court of 12
judges, Rosky said he doubts they will get a
different result, and the request may not
even be granted.
The court’s two-to-one ruling affirms U.S.
District Judge Robert Shelby’s December
decision, which struck down Utah’s ban on
same-sex marriage and prompted more than
a 1,000 same-sex couples to marry during a
17-day window before the U.S. Supreme
Court issued a stay, halting all such
weddings.
Wednesday’s decision "certainly lends legal
clarity at this stage," said Salt Lake County
District Attorney Sim Gill.
But it remains unclear what practical effect
it will have, if any, Gill said.
The state of Utah now has 90 days to ask the
high court to weigh in, Gill said. The only
way that counties would be free to
immediately start issuing marriage licenses
to same-sex couples would be if the state
chooses not to petition the high court, he
said.
"The ball really goes back to the state of
Utah," Gill said.

591

The Utah attorney general’s office released
this statement Wednesday: "Although the
Court’s 2-1 split decision does not favor the
State, we are pleased that the ruling has been
issued and takes us one step closer to
reaching certainty and finality for all Utahns
on such an important issue with a decision
from the highest court.
"For that to happen, the Utah Attorney
General’s Office intends to file a Petition for
Writ of Certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court. The Tenth Circuit Court’s
issuance of a stay will avoid further
uncertainty until the case is finally resolved.
Whether the Utah Attorney General’s Office
seeks en banc [full court] review of the
Tenth Circuit’s ruling has yet to be
determined."
Despite the continuing uncertainty, attorney
Peggy Tomsic, who represented the three
same-sex couples who are plaintiffs in the
Kitchen v. Herbert lawsuit that is the subject
of Wednesday’s decision, called the ruling
"an absolute victory for fairness and
equality" for the people of Utah and other
states in the 10th Circuit.
Plaintiff’s Moudi Sbeity and Derek Kitchen,
had posted this Facebook comment: "Today
is a great day for all that came before us, for
all in the current trenches fighting for
equality, and for all who are affected.
"The 10th Circuit upheld Judge Shelby’s
ruling, affirming that the right to marry and
love is a right guaranteed to all Americans,"
the couple said. "Thank you all for the
outpouring of love and support, and
especially a huge thank you to our team and
co-plaintiffs. Love on, Utah!"

Many conservatives in Utah were
disheartened by the ruling, but they have not
given up in their fight to keep marriage
between a man and a woman.
Gov. Gary Herbert issued a statement saying
he was “disappointed."
"I believe states have the right to determine
their laws regarding marriage. I am grateful
the Court issued a stay to allow time to
analyze the decision and our options. But as
I have always said, all Utahns deserve
clarity and finality regarding same-sex
marriage and that will only come from the
Supreme Court."
Sen. Orrin Hatch made headlines recently by
saying in May that it was almost a certainty
that gay marriage will become legal. That
said, he still expressed disappointment at the
10th Circuit’s actions.
"Although I am not surprised by today’s
decision, I disagree with the court’s
reasoning and hope the Supreme Court
ultimately adheres to the original
understanding of the Constitution and allow
each state to define marriage for itself," he
said.
Rep. Rob Bishop, R-Utah, said, "Utahns
have made clear their wishes on this subject
and their wishes should not be superseded
by a judge. Additionally, protecting the 1st
Amendment and religious institutions’ rights
and ability to uphold and act in accordance
with their beliefs and principles must be a
priority."
The Sutherland Institute, a conservative
think tank, promised to help gather a legal
team to defend the state’s gay marriage ban.
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"Any appeal at the U.S. Supreme Court is
the main event and may decide the future of
marriage for decades," according to a
statement from Sutherland. "Defenders of
marriage
must
be
prepared.
It’s
disappointing to have a few federal judges
decide that they can unilaterally override the
decision of Utah voters to preserve marriage
as society’s way of preserving children’s
opportunity to be reared by a mother and
father."
The ruling affects all states in the 10th
Circuit Court of Appeals: Colorado, Kansas,
New Mexico, Oklahoma, Utah and
Wyoming.
The court’s majority opinion focused on the
14th Amendment, which gives equal
protection to American citizens. The court
said its reading of the Constitution shows
that the legal rights of married couples has
nothing to do with the gender of those in the
union.
"We hold that the Fourteenth Amendment
protects the fundamental right to marry,
establish a family, raise children, and enjoy
the full protection of a state’s marital laws.
A state may not deny the issuance of a
marriage license to two persons, or refuse to
recognize their marriage, based solely upon
the sex of the persons in the marriage
union," the appellate court said.
"Courts do not sit in judgment of the hearts
and minds of citizens."
The majority judges attacked the state’s
arguments, which centered largely around
how same-sex marriage affects child-rearing
and religious freedom.

The judges wrote that the state’s arguments
rested on a link between marriage and
procreation — an argument that they said
failed because opposite-sex couples who do
not or cannot procreate are still allowed to
marry.
"Utah citizens may choose a spouse of the
opposite sex regardless of the pairing’s
procreative capacity," the opinion reads.
"The elderly, those medically unable to
conceive, and those who exercise their
fundamental right not to have biological
children are free to marry and have their outof-state marriages recognized in Utah,
apparently without breaking the ‘conceptual
link between marriage and procreation.’"
The judges pointed out that the only
reference to reproduction in Utah’s marriage
law is a provision that allows first cousins to
marry if they are over 65 years old or are
over 55 and cannot reproduce.
The judges also emphasized that religious
leaders are still free to practice their
sacraments and traditions as they see fit, and
are not required to allow same-sex marriage
in their churches.
"We continue to recognize the right of the
various religions to define marriage
according to their moral, historical and
ethical precepts," the opinion reads. "Our
opinion does not intrude into that domain or
the exercise of religious principles in this
arena. The right of an officiant to perform or
decline to perform a religious ceremony in
unaffected by today’s ruling."
Also Wednesday, a federal judge in
Indianapolis struck down Indiana’s ban on
same-sex marriage Wednesday, according to
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the Associated Press. The ruling took effect
immediately, allowing same-sex couples to
marry.
The 10th Circuit Court on Wednesday split
along that same lines that were formed
during oral arguments in April, with pointed
questions asked by the three judges — Paul
J. Kelly Jr., Carlos F. Lucero and Jerome A.
Holmes — about marriage studies,
jurisdiction and standard of scrutiny.
At that time, Kelly — who was the
dissenting judge in Wednesday’s opinion —
had asked the plaintiffs’ attorney hard
questions about state authority.
Kelly on Wednesday disagreed that the
Fourteenth Amendment requires Utah to
extend marriage to same-sex couple or
recognize those marriages from other states.
He noted that the U.S. Supreme Court has
recognized a fundamental right to marriage
but said every decision vindicating that right
has involved two opposite-gender people.
"Indeed, the Court has been less than
solicitous of plural marriages or polygamy,"
Kelly wrote. "If the States are the
laboratories of democracy, requiring every
state to recognize same-gender unions —
contrary to the views of its electorate and
representatives — [it] turns the notion of a
limited national government on its head."
Marriage does not exist in a vacuum and
states have the right to regulate it, the judge
said. He said Utah should prevail because
the state has shown a rational basis for its
decision — responsible procreation,
effective parenting and the desire to proceed
cautiously with a new social phenomenon.

"Utah’s justifications for not extending
marriage to include same-gender couples are
not irrefutable. But they don’t need to be;
they need only be based upon ‘any
reasonably conceivable state of facts,’ "
Kelly wrote.
He also wrote, "We should resist the
temptation to become philosopher-kings,
imposing our views under the guise of
constitutional
interpretation
of
the
Fourteenth Amendment."
During the April arguments in Denver,
Tomsic had asked the judges to ensure
marriage equality for all, while the state’s
lead attorney, Gene C. Schaerr, asked them
to preserve marriage rights only for
opposite-sex couples.
The state argued at that hearing that children
benefit from being parented by a mother and
a father, not two mothers or two fathers.
But Tomsic also argued that the case is
about family. She said couples want to
provide for and protect each other legally,
and children are demeaned and humiliated
when their parents are unable to marry and
provide them with the benefits and
protections associated with the civil
institution.
Rosky called Wednesday’s ruling "a
bipartisan decision," noting that Kelly was
nominated to the bench by former President
George H.W. Bush, Lucero was nominated
in by former President Bill Clinton and
Holmes was nominated by former President
George W. Bush.
Utah legislator Jim Dabakis, who is openly
gay and was married during the brief time in
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December when same-sex marriage in Utah
was legal, said of the ruling: "I am joyous,
as I know hundreds of thousands of LGBT
folks and their families are, all across the
great state of Utah. This is a pro-family
decision and it fits squarely with true Utah
family values — love, kindness and a fair
playing field for all. It’s wonderful to see
Utah, once again lead the country in gay
rights."
Salt Lake City Mayor Ralph Becker said,
"This is a great day for the laws of the
United States, but it still has a long way to
go," noting that the 10th Circuit expects the
Supreme Court to have the final say.
The mayor, who helped marry gay couples
in the hours after Judge Shelby’s ruling last
December, noted that Utah’s key role in a
legal process that may affect the entire
nation.
The state "is playing a leading role in one of
the major issues in our day for social
justice" Becker said. "For me, it is exciting."
Evan Wolfson, president of Freedom to
Marry, released a statement saying that
ruling "has brought us one giant step closer
to the day when all Americans will have the
freedom to marry. This first federal
appellate ruling affirms what more than 20
other courts all across the country have
found: There is no good reason to perpetuate
unfair marriage discrimination any longer.
America is ready for the freedom to marry,
and it is time for the Supreme Court to bring
our country to national resolution and it
should do so now."
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day
Saints released a statement saying: "The

Church has been consistent in its support of
marriage between a man and a woman and
teaches that all people should be treated with
respect. In anticipation that the case will be
brought before the U.S. Supreme Court, it is
our hope that the nation’s highest court will
uphold traditional marriage."
Meanwhile, a group called Mormons for
Equality said many LDS Church members
around the country were "celebrating
today’s ruling as a positive step toward
protecting more families and children in our
society.
"We appreciate in particular that the judges
clearly addressed the distinction between the
civil and religious marriage, and affirmed
that ‘religious institutions remain as free as
they always have been to practice their
sacraments and traditions as they see fit.’
"This ruling confirms that civil marriage
equality is not a question about religious
beliefs or practices, but rather of what public
policies will treat all members of our society
fairly and protect the diverse families which
exist in our communities."
John Mejia, legal director of the American
Civil Liberties Union of Utah, said in a news
release, "This is a proud day for everybody
in the state of Utah, and everybody across
the country, who supports marriage
equality."
The ACLU had submitted a "friend of the
court" brief in support of the plaintiffs in the
Kitchen v. Herbert lawsuit. The ACLU also
has filed a lawsuit in Utah federal court
seeking recognition of the marriages of
same-sex couples who were wed during the
17-day period when they were legal.
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The Democratic candidate for Utah attorney
general, Charles Stormont, said that as
attorney general, he would immediately drop
the appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court,
because it is "an enormous waste of money
and we should be fighting to protect
people’s rights, not to take them away. The
state has no business dictating how people
build their families, and the State should
never tell children or their parents that they
are second class citizens."
Regarding the decision in Indiana, Rea
Carey, Executive Director of the National
Gay and Lesbian Task Force, said, "We are
delighted that same-sex couples in the
Hoosier State will now have the option of
marriage. Marriage equality has clearly
reached a critical mass and we can look
forward to all Americans having the
freedom to marry."
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